The Tanzimat State and Its Legitimacy*
The nineteenth century undoubtedly was “the Longest Century of the Ottoman Empire”.1 There were very important military, economic and administrative problems pending which inherited from previous centuries. At the same time, Serbian Revolt (1805), Greek War of Independence (1821-1826) and Question of Egypt were the primary reasons for reforms in the nineteenth century. The “Tanzimat (orders, reforms)” did not start with the proclamation of Hatt-ı Hümayün on 3 November 1839. It is more appropriate to take the beginning from the reign of Mahmud II. Throughout the century, reforms were sustained by Ottoman rulers on the fields from jurisprudence to administration and from education to economics. In this respect, in the nineteenth century the Ottoman Empire might be called as the “Tanzimat State”.2 In this short article my aim is to understand the spirit of “Tanzimat State”; analyze its reactions against the matters mentioned above and find legitimate answer for its application by subjects.
Initially, I would like to mention on the sultans and the bureaucrats of the “Tanzimat State” Their aims and reforms were different from their predecessors’ and they showed us what Tanzimat was. Firstly, they were aware that there was no going back to “Golden Age”. Essences of reforms were ‘making of the modern State’ in the Western sense.3 Secondly, they were highly aware of what was going on in the Europe and provinces. The fact Sublime Porte bureaucrats came from foreign affairs: Mustafa Reşid himself had been long time as ambassador in Paris and London.4 Secondly, they tried to establish “bureaucratic central authority”. This process began with Mahmud II: Although Alemdar supported him he refused to sign “Deed of Agreement” in 1808 and he kept his silence after Alemdar was killed by Janissaries. Abolition of Janissaries in 1826 was the second step of this process. After the destruction of threats against to reforms in the center and provinces he established a central army. With the proclamation of Tanzimat Edict ‘bureaucratic centralization’ reached its peak. In this period, ministries established, provinces reordered and Valis appointed to from center and tax collection centralized.5
Tanzimat was a common result of ‘inside’ and ‘outside’ developments. Tanzimat rulers were highly conscious of the threat of ‘nationalism’ for the Sublime State. They correctly read “Greek War Independence” which was the first nationalist uprising in the Empire.6 In this sense, Tanzimat rulers wanted to prevent their Gayr-i Muslim reaya from this undesirable situation by giving them equal rights with Muslim subjects even on the text. At the same time, Tanzimat was beneficial for Muslims. Sultan and his bureaucrats could not ignore the Muslim subjects. They did not also trust Muslims. During the Kavalalı problem, even in Anatolia many Muslim had sympathy for Kavalalı movement; there was no actual reaction to stop his son in Anatolia; he successfully managed to control South-eastern part of Anatolia more than 8 years without any serious social reaction.7 In this regard, Sublime Porte directly took all subjects as addressee; gave important promises; and, thought to unite them under a secular umbrella.
On the other hand, when the time comes for the “Application of Tanzimat” –İnalcık talks after one week its proclamation in Gülhane, it made reach every corner of Domains with strict language- its social reactions comes differently. Although Mustafa Reşid did many administrative and fiscal reform to applied Tanzimat.8 When I read İnalcık’s article, I have sense like the reactions all about steam from the fiscal change and tax problem.9 He takes the Niş and Vidin Rebellions as such. There was serious contradiction between the “promise” and “application” of Tanzimat with other less important reason people rebel in these reagion as against to application or at least improper application of it. Then the Tanzimat State suppressed the rebellions immediately because of fear of international interfere.10 These two examples İnalcık gave seem to me take the only fiscal side of the reactions. He gives less attention ancient social order and its resistance to new one both in Balkans and Anatolia.
As a conclusion, there were crucially important challenges inflicting from inside and outside. Reactions of Ottoman rulers to figure out these matters were the indication of real transformation. Nineteenth century Ottoman rulers’ education, vision, and perception of reforms were noticeable to catch on the esprit of this process. Tanzimat was a synthesis of old and new; religious and secular; and, practical and bureaucratic in order to get out of difficulties. Consequently, when a historian read Tanzimat period properly, he would keep himself off making sympatic great exaggerations or sarcastic overgeneralizations.
Notes:
1 I am referring the magnificent book an my general summary on it: “Ortaylı, İlber. 2003. İmparatorluğun en uzun yüzyılı. Vol. 565. İstanbul: İletişim yayınları.”
2 Instead of giving broad summary political atmosphere of nineteenth century, I think to raise basic political and social problems based on: “Quataert, “The 19th century” in The Ottoman Empire, 1700-1922. New York: Cambridge University Press,2000. pp. 54-74”
3 Mehmet Seyitdanlıoğlu, "Yenileme Dönemi Osmanlı Devlet Teşkilatı.” Türkler. Ankara: Yeni Türkiye Yayınları, 2002. p. 561
4 Ibid. p. 564
5 Ibid.
6 In here, Donald Quataert rightly tends to see these rebellions as internal issue, but this does not change the very content of rebellions: “Quataert, “The 19th century” in The Ottoman Empire, 1700-1922. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000. p. 54-6
7 Quataert, p 58 with impression of lecture notes on Kavalalı during class.
8 Halil İnalcık, “Application of the Tanzimat and its Social Effects,” Archivum Ottomanicum, 5, 1973. p. 97
9 Ibid. p. 108
10 Ibid. p. 125-27