Mearsheimer: The Tragedy of Great Power Politics In The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, author John Mearsheimer outlines a new theory of international relations which he calls “offensive realism.” Mearsheimer’s theory is a spin-off of Kenneth Waltz’s neorealism, also known as structural or defensive realism. Mearsheimer follows on the premises of Kenneth Waltz’s theory by deriving the behavior of states from the “structure” of the international system.
Mearsheimer outlines five assumptions or premises comprising his theoretical foundation: 1) the international system is anarchic (no world government) 2) all states posses some offensive capability and are thus capable of using force against other states 3) no state can be certain another state will not use force against it 4) survival, territorial integrity, and domestic autonomy are the primal goals of all states and 5) great powers are rational actors (Mearsheimer 2001, pp. 30-31).
It is difficult to definitively discern what conclusions Mearsheimer thinks follow from these premises (Wagner 2007, pg. 14). He argues for perhaps three conclusions: 1) great powers have powerful incentives to “think and act offensively with regard to each other…In particular, three general patterns of behavior result: fear, self-help, and power maximization (Mearsheimer 2001, pg.32)” 2) even states that want only to survive end up pursuing hegemony as the ultimate insurance for survival 3) even states that care only about their survival may end up in war. These conclusions constitute what Mearsheimer calls the tragedy of international politics (Mearsheimer 2001, pp. 1-3).
This tragedy is embodied in what Mearsheimer describes as the “security dilemma.” The security dilemma stipulates that “the measures a state takes to increase its own security usually decreases the security of other states. Thus, it is difficult for a state to increase its own chances of survival without threatening the survival of other states” (Mearsheimer 2001, pg. 36). Of course the security dilemma cannot operate unless we also include the premise that no state can be insured that another state will not attack it (Wagner 2007, pg 26).
In chapter eight Mearsheimer offers an explanation of the causes of war, or so he claims. In reality, he simply outlines three plausible structures of the international system and the relative probability of war under each structure.
From his analysis of the structure of the international system and state’s interests, Mearsheimer concludes that states strive for at least regional hegemony and the prevention of the rise of another regional hegemon. Mearsheimer argues that this is precisely the strategy of the United States and that it can best achieve its goals through what he calls “buck passing” and “off shore balancing.” Mearsheimer argues that the balance of power in Europe is currently stable and that the US need not employ an active foreign policy there. In fact, he argues the US should bring its troops home from Europe as European security provision is not vital to American interests. Mearsheimer similarly argues that security provision in Northeast Asia is not a vital American interest. In contrast to Europe, however, he argues that China has the latent power potential to become a regional hegemon in Northeast Asia and thus the US should employ an active foreign policy of offshore balancing in relation to China.
Critiquing Mearsheimer: Mearsheimer’s theory is an example of deduction. In order for a deductive theory to be logically valid, the conclusion(s) must follow from the premises. Mearsheimer, as all realists do, fails on this account. A fully developed critique of Mearsheimer, and the lack of validity within his argument, is outside the scope of this assignment. Therefore, my critique of his logic will focus primarily on anarchy.
I will outline three general critiques of Mearsheimer’s argument which I believe are most important for better understating international politics, particularly US-China relations. First is the anarchic logic of structural realism. In creating this logic, realists draw on Hobbes’ theorizing about the state of nature for individuals. Mearsheimer and Waltz adopt Hobbes’ theory to the anarchic structure of the international system. In order to complete this step in their theorizing, both Waltz and Mearsheimer argue that that neither the domestic politics nor the leaders of states matter, thereby treating states as individuals with one monolithic goal—survival.
This is a fatal flaw in realism and in Mearsheimer’s theory. Neither Mearsheimer nor any other realist makes any attempt to explain why or how they can leap from Hobbes’ state of nature for individuals to a Hobbesian state of nature in the international system. They just assert that it is the case. It is not possible to understand the behavior of states in the international system without accounting for the domestic structure of the state. I will give two examples to illustrate my argument.
American grand strategy during the Cold War was built around George Kennan’s premise about the domestic origins of Soviet foreign policy. He argued that the domestic politics of regime survival drove Soviet foreign policy, not survival against other states in the international system. Kennan argued that the Soviet state had to create the fear of external threats to sustain its domestic survival.
In the run up to WWI, Germany faced domestic constraints on its ability to sustain arms races first with Britain and then more importantly with Russia. Germany also faced domestic political and self inflicted socio-cultural constraints on its ability to expand the ranks of its army. Russia, on the other hand, did not face the same domestic constraints on military expansion as it was authoritarian and could thus conscript large numbers of soldiers. Nor did Russia have any problem with conscripting large numbers of peasants into the ranks of its army. Moreover, French capital injections into the Russian state for the purpose of building an army and railroads to transport it meant Russia faced fewer financial constraints than Germany. Fearing a relatively more powerful Russia at the end of Russia’s second great program, to be completed in 1917, Germany fought a preventive war against Russia in 1914[1].
A second critique of Mearsheimer is his attempt in chapter eight to explain the causes of war. International relations, and thus international relations theory, is fundamentally about explaining “the relation between organized violence and political order at the international level” (Wagner 2007, pg. ix). Thus it is noteworthy that Mearsheimer attempts this feat, especially given that Waltz, as he keenly notes, never really attempted it. However, Mearsheimer decisively fails in his attempt. What he ultimately offers is the relative probability of war under different structures of the international system (bipolarity, balanced and unbalanced multipolarity). This is not an explanation of how war occurs. In order to understand how war occurs, it is important to first note that war is costly. Given that war is costly, and states are rational actors, we must think about andexplain why states would fight. Is it just because of anarchy, or the “polarity” of the system, or because of the security dilemma? I think not. I think the answer lies in the bargaining theory of war. While this is a discussion that lies outside the purview of this paper, it does bring me to my third crucial critique of Mearsheimer’s theory.
Mearsheimer argues that states cannot provide each other with guarantees that they do not harbor hostile intentions. However, as with the assumption that domestic politics are irrelevant, he simply asserts that this is fact. Thus the question still remains, as Harrison Wagner skillfully points out, whether democracy or trade or some other mechanism could lead states not to fight (Wagner 2007 pg. 23). After all, we know that European political evolution trended toward the adoption of democratic institutions as a means to manage conflict among not only individuals but also predatory states.
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[1] See Niall Ferguson The Pity of War: Explaining WWI (Great Britain: Penguin Press, 1998), David Fromkin Europe’s Last Summer: Who Started the Great War in 1914? (New York: Random House, 2004), and David M. Rowe “The Tragedy of Liberalism: How Globalization Caused the First World War,” Security Studies, 14, 3 (Spring 2005), pp. 407-447.
Mearsheimer, John J. The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 2001)