Boko Haram in Nigeria
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Boko Haram in Nigeria
Following the September 11, 2001, attack in the United States of America, terrorism took a new dimension, not just in the country, but across the globe. The scale of terrorism spread to other regions, with terror groups increasing their diverse agendas. In addition to this increment, the need to develop new counter-terror campaigns became inevitable. Terrorism is an act of spreading brutality against the civilians with the aim of realizing political or aggressive goals. In the recent past, major continents have been terror victims, driven by different armed groups with various agendas. Defining terrorism is sometimes tricky. This is because they can be seen as freedom fighters to the natives but to the government or civilians, they are terrorists. More often than not, terrorists are driven by hatred that is passed through generations. What aspired towards the September attack towards the United States of America was perceived animosity between the Muslims in the Middle East and the Americans. In fact, the majority of the causalities were the Americans, while the terrorist were affiliated with al Qaeda.
As mentioned earlier, what started as hatred against the Americans turned out to be a global catastrophe. The Western part of Africa is no exception, particularly in Nigeria. In the past decade, al Qaeda-affiliated group commonly referred to as the Boko Haram has been on the rampage in Nigeria. Boko Haram is drawn from The Hausa language, which roughly translates to western education or civilization is ungodly, sinful or prohibited. The overriding objective of this group is to create an Islamic state in the northern (International Crisis Group, 2010). Even though the group had initially staged sporadic attacks against the civilians and the government, the abduction of more than 200 female students, on April 14th, 2014, in one of the Government Girls Secondary School, Borno state raised global eyes. Global leaders condemned the act while others used social media campaigns to condemn the act under the tag #BringBackOurGirls. Sporadic attacks and aggression against the civilians are meant to undermine the government control in the northern region of Nigeria (BBC Africa, 2009).
More often than not, the strategy of countering terrorism is mostly attributed to the effect of the threat towards the civilians. Moreover, the policies attributed to counterterrorism measures are made up of three major elements that include enemy, global surrounding and friendly. The three components further lay ground for other relevant lines of efforts, forming a firm foundation of direct and indirect approaches. Direct method involves confronting the insurgency directly while indirect includes creating an operational environment that is hostile to the terrorists and at the same time prevent possible re-emergency of a similar group in future.
Although there has been a re-emergency of the Boko Haram in 2010, the Nigerian government has recorded a substantial success against the insurgency. Nevertheless, the attacks in the recent past indicate that more still needs to be done. One of the primary strategies used by the Nigerian counterterrorism forces is by attacking the insurgency leadership as well as destroying their operation cells. This has been achieved by the use of military force, through joint forces in the neighboring countries, such as Cameron, Niger, and Chad, where these terrorists pose a major threat (Ker & Iomongu 2012). In addition to military force, the Nigerian government has in the past resolved for dialogue to address some of the major issues raised by these groups. Following the recommendation of a task force formed to negotiate with the insurgency on September 16, 2011, the then president Olusegun Obasanjo led the negotiations with some of the Boko Haram associates, where they presented tier grievances. These negotiations took place in strongholds, in the northeastern city of Maiduguri.
Subsequently, the government realized that military alone cannot halt the activities of these terrorists. As such, it has taken what it terms as a soft approach as a supplementary counterterrorism measure to fight radicalization. According to the Nigeria's National Security Adviser Sambo Dasuki (2014), the government decided to `understand the problem to apply the appropriate solution`, referring to non-military solutions. He went further to acknowledge that terrorism is a complex issue that requires an equally sophisticated approach to stop radicalization. Another primary intent of soft counterterrorism measures that the Nigerian government has observed is the economic plan in the northern parts of the country. Whereas the southern part is mostly developed from the revenue generated from oil fields, most of the citizens in the southern part live in abject poverty. Social injustices, poverty and dilapidated state of the economy are some of the driving forces of the insurgency. Since the violence started, dozens of people have been displaced decreasing the economic activities, which further increase the poverty levels. Perhaps this is one of the many reasons why Boko Haram has taken root in the northern part. Even if there has been little evidence that the government is doing enough to alleviate poverty in the country, subsequent claims by highly placed government officials shows the willingness to address economic status of the country (Dasuki, 2014).
Nigeria, like any other country facing terror threats, has crafted policies that are meant to address the issues at hand. Terrorism Prevention Act 2011 is one of the major anti-terrorism bills that were crafted to incorporate counterterrorism strategies and tactics within the law (Federal Government of Nigeria, 1999). Unfortunately, much as it sounds exhaustive and inclusive to the ears of the lawmakers, the bill has no objective or strategy listed down. If anything, the law only criminalizes the act of terror defined as terrorism. The Nigeria’s counterterrorism policy is not effective as much. This is because it does not state ways to prevent the formation of terror groups. While the system seeks to punish those involved in terror acts, it does not indicate ways to address or prevent these acts, hence making it ineffective. Albeit other policies that might supplement the prevention of the issues mentioned above, it is fundamental to ensure that the existing policies are specific in what they state. This is due to the degree of threat that faces the country. If the country is not secure enough, there are high chances that its economy and its subsequent stability will crumble.
Strategies adopted to counter terrorism are highly dynamic. Tactics that work in one part of the world might not succeed in other regions. Therefore, it is hard to judge precisely the counterinsurgency measures taken in Nigeria effective or not. Nevertheless, it is fundamental to ensure that counterterrorism measures are inclusive and broad enough to address all possible solutions. A quick review of Nigeria’s counterterrorism measures shows some shortcomings. To start with, the act should come up with ways of preventing, rather than responding to the threats caused by the insurgency. This is vital since more force is likely to create more resistance that eventually leads to radicalization.
Still on the economic status of the northern parts of the country, the government should consider the decentralization of major functions, including security. The locals are often in a better place to understand their challenges, as opposed to the national government. Furthermore, decentralization of major functions might enhance the economic status of the locals living in the abject poverty. It also sensitizes the locals to be vigilant in order to protect their economic empire against the saboteurs. Besides, creating a decentralized government will enable the local leaders to develop their backyards, addressing the common challenges faced by the locals. In addition to this, decentralization will ensure more jobs are created. Addressing social injustices and political isolation in terms of development is also relatively easier.
Muslims mostly dominate Nigeria. Boko Haram uses the Islamic ideologies to justify their actions against the government and civilian. Unfortunately, the victims of these religious hatred propagations include illiteracy among the members (Gboyega, 1990). As such, the government should come up with ways to monitor or educate religious leaders to desist from teaching hatred among the members. Nonetheless, the monitoring and harmonization of religious teaching must be done within the law, without interfering with the freedom of worship. To support these efforts, promoting educations in efforts to eradicate poverty is vital for the country. A country that largely depends on oil for revenue should ensure that the resources are equally distributed across the nation. This will ensure that poverty is alleviated, giving the natives a chance to fight against terror ideas and youth radicalizations (National Bureau of Statistics, 2012). Albeit job creation is often a political vehicle to ascend to power, global leaders should ensure that political leaders are held responsible for their utterances. Conversely, the Nigerian problems start and end with Nigeria (Tunji, 2014). As such, the Nigerian people should take it upon themselves to protect their freedom and ensure that their country moves forward.
In summary, terrorism is a complex issue that should be handled with sober minds. Politicking about insurgency is dangerous as it can result in instability eventually leading to a subsequent collapse of the country. One of the reasons as to why the United States of America has been in a position to prevent the reoccurrence of September 11, 2001, attack is the fact that it moved swiftly to tighten its policies against terrorism. Other regions should learn from these measures, which include the creation of an entire department dedicated to preventing terrorism. Least but not least, prevention is better than cure. The global political, religious and social elite should observe precautionary measures in efforts to curb global terrorism.

References Ajayi, Gboyega. 1990. “Government and Religious Patronage in Contemporary Nigeria (1980-1989): Implications for the Stability of the Nation.” Zeitschrift fur Afrikastudien, no. 7/8: 55-65. Akande, Tunji. 2014. “Youth Unemployment in Nigeria: A Situation Analysis.” Brookings, September 23. Accessed January 17, 2016. http://www.brookings.edu/ blogs/africa-in-focus/posts/2014/09/23-youth-unemployment-nigeria-akande. BBC Africa. 2009. “Nigeria Offers Militants Amnesty.” June 26. Accessed January 17, 2016. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/8118314.stm. Federal Government of Nigeria. “1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria with Amendments” (2011), http://www.rvision.org/epubl/Niger_constitution_1999.pdf. International Crisis Group (2010). “Northern Nigeria: Background to Conflict”. International Crisis Group Africa Report no. 168 Krueger, Alan and Jitka Malečková 2003. “Education, Poverty and Terrorism: Is There a Causal Connection?”. Journal of Economic Perspectives 17, no. 4 Ker, Iomongu 2012. “Diagnostic Review of Insurgency in Nigeria: The Cultural Dimension”. The Eminent and Expert Working Group Meeting on National Counter Insurgency Strategy, The National Institute for Policy and Strategic Studies (NIPSS), Kuru, Plateau State. Mohammed Sambo Dasuki. 2014 Nigeria’s Soft Approach To Countering Terrorism (1) http://leadership.ng/features/356955/nigerias-soft-approach-countering-terrorism-1 National Bureau of Statistics (2012). “Nigeria Poverty Profile 2010 Report," p. 16. http://www.tucrivers.org/tucpublications/Nigeria%20Poverty%20Profile%202010.pdf.