“Many soldiers are led to faulty ideas of war by knowing too much about too little” (1944). “Americans love a winner and will not tolerate a loser. Americans play to win all the time. I wouldn’t give a hoot in Hell for a man who lost and laughed. That’s why Americans have never lost and will never lose a war. Because the very thought of losing is hateful to Americans. Now an army is a team. It lives, eats, sleeps and fights as a team. This individuality stuff is a bunch of crap. The Bilious bastards who wrote that stuff about individuality for the Saturday Evening Post, don’t know anything more about real battle than they do about fornicating” (1944). Part-time Warriors, Weekend Warriors, An Army of One? None of these notions would seem to pass the common sense test of General George S. Patton. Soldiers go to battle, not citizens. The idea that a soldier who has wholely commited his life and foresaken his personal freedom to the idea that he will spend each and every waking moment engaged in the pursuit of the defense of democracy by the means directed by the leaders of America appointed by the people of our nation, can be compaired to phrases such as; Part-time Warriors, Weekend Warriors, An Army of One is not only absurd but an outrage. Military service is not an occupation. It is a way of life. To give Reserve Soldiers the overwhelming responsibity of achieving the same level of proficiency as a Regular Army Soldier given a measly six weeks a year of preparation and training is not only irresponsible but criminal.
The history of the Reserve Army dates back to August 23, 1908 with the passing of Senate Bill 1424 (Brown 2008). The Reserve force was a Medical Corps and the first reserve force until 1912 when the Army Appropriations Act of 1912 allowed for Regular Army Reserve force (1913). The plan was to be a “constructive application to modern American conditions” (1913) as it should have been and should be today. At the onset of such a force we knew that the conditions of the time would dictate the force needed and the method in which it would and could be deployed. The plan called for Regular Army Reserves, Unorganized Reserves, Special Reserves and Reserves for citizen soldiery. Among other details and committee recommendations was the Council of National Defense which was to include the President of the United States, the Secretary of State, Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy; the Senate Appropriations committee chairman; foreign, military and naval affairs representatives; the House of Representatives also had the Appropriations committee chairman; foreign, military and naval affairs representatives; along with the Chief of general staff of the Army; an officer of the Navy, the president of the War college and the Navy college (1913). The meer magnitude of representation outlines the importance of such a decision in our military history. These decisions were not come by lightly nor were they measured by an evaluation of a period of conditions from a hundred years previous. The Reserve force had the frame work to be a force capable of maintaining a minimal level of military comprehension and an ability, that when faced with the neccessity to augment the size of the Regular Army, these forces would possess the basic skill sets to fulfill a gap in troop strength with adequate time to develop into a comprable force to that of their career oriented counterparts in the Regular Army. Further more the National Guard and its edict of the defense of the Union and execution of its laws, the suppression of insurrection and the ability to repell invasion prevented the use of the National Guard outside the continental United States in time of war or threatening periods. In 1913 the demand on the Regular Army force was high with trouble brewing in the Phillipines and a need for a substantial force in Panama with the progess of the Panamal canal.
The military force was faced with change. A significant change in structure and the leadership dynamic that was met with resistance and led to the removal of Major General Ainsworth from his post as Adjutant General of the United States, by the Secretary of War, Mr Stimson. Who took a more centralized approach to the execution of the changes in the force structure of the period not to mention the personal history of conflicts between the two men. The original intent of using the Army Reserve force as a medical force was exceptionally successful leading into World War I the reserve force had over 21,000 officers and some 35,000 enlisted. In fact the reserve doctor force was greater than the Regular Army force and the reserve nurses numbered almost half of the regular Army nurses (2011 ). From the onset of the design of the Army Reserve, to the present day conflicts facing our nation. The role of the Army Reserve has changed in purpose, design and employment. The major concerns however have been overridden by the neccessity to meet budgeting bottom lines. The use of the Army Reserve today is not the same in effect or importance as it was a century ago. Given the advances in technology and modern warfare; the additions of tactical techniques and advanced robotic machines, there simply is no way possible for a force of soldiers who have a tenth of the training, experience and knowledge of the fighting principles and practices of the twenty first centry battlefield, to adequately compare to the career soldier.
Admirably a large number of Army Reservists stepped forward and offered to serve immediately after the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon (2008). The Army Reserve orginally planned for several purposes and branches in 1913 was not planning for such an event or for the use of the reserve force in the method in which the force is being used in today’s fight against terrorism. The design of the reserve force has a structure of training that does not give it the strategy it needs to meet the demands it is being asked to do. There quite simply is not enough organizational learning being conducted within the standard Army Reserve force to augment the Regular Army forces as they complete assignments on the battlefield and are relieved to recover and reconstitute from periods of deployment in battle. The typical Army Reserve unit conducts training two days a month and an additional fourteen days consecutively a year. That equates to a total of thirtyeight days of what most certainly should be high intensity, high impact training emphasizing military occupational specialty development and execution, as well as the most current and pertanent tactics, techniques and procedures being employed on the battlefield. There are several ways that the Army Reserve force can improve their knowledge of their part-time employment specialties. Utilizing Army Reserve forces in fields that are directly related to civilian fields is the method General Abrams used in Vietnam era (2004). Essentially reducing the combat support and combat service support forces of the Regular Army and using the Army Reserve forces in fields like engineering, supply, maintenance and medicine General Abrams reduced the troop strength and prevented an increase in troop size by the President who wanted to do so without the approval of Congress. He essentially hobled the Presidents design to bypass Congressional approval by eliminating the Regular Army’s ability to support itself. Today the Army Reserve is still primarily a combat support and combat service support organization that is utilizing mimicry of its Regular Army counterparts to assist their actions on the battlefield. By the process of forced exposure these units are now gaining experience not through well planned, financed and supported training but through trial and error. In the battle field environment, trial and error is not the preffered method of learning for any military force. Both Regular Army and Army Reserve units are utilizing grafting and scanning techniques to improve their unit success potential.
In the Vietnam war General Creighton Abrams assumed the command of the war from General William C. Westmoreland (Birtle 2008). General Abrams envisioned the Army Reserve force as a force that could perform the support roles for the Army with reserve soldiers that did similar jobs in their communities on a daily basis. That being, an accountant for a maketing firm could join the reserves as an accountant for the Army Reserves. This would minimalize the amount of training the individual needed in his career specialty and allow for minimal annual training on behalf of the Army Reserves. In theory the concept seemed to be a sound one. However, today that accountant is a Army Reservist with an occupational specialty in logistics. To make matters further from the specificity principal that should have eliminated the need for an intense training cycle on military specialty development. Today’s battle field is not a cold war era, linear battle field with a line in the sand that delinneates between friendly forces and the enemy. In reality the battle field of today has the enemy living among the soldiers in battle and in many cases working for our side. The antiquated idea that combat support and combat service support forces don’t see very much enemy contact is quite simply, wrong. Today there is no difference between the need for combat skills ability of an infantryman and a cook. There isn’t a difference in the need for a tanker to be able to use his side arm and a female to be able to close with and kill the enemy.
The combat environement has changed drastically since the inception of the Army Reserve and so has its mission:
The Army Reserve’s mission, undert Title 10 of the U.S. code, is to provide trained, equipped, and ready Soldiers and cohesive units to meet the global requirements across the full spectrum of operations. The Army Reserve is a key element in The Army multi-component unit force, training with Active and National Guard units to ensure all three components work as a fully integrated team.
• Enabling the Army to do more with fewer resources, by providing a flexible, will-trained, complementary force that can expand and contract to meet the specific needs and challenges of each new mission.
• Training Soldiers at the highets possible level in one of nearly 200 specific skills in order to support the Army on any air, land or sea mission.
• Maintaining a force that can mobilize rapidly and skillfully at any moment to respond to a crisis or situation, or to defend America’s interests at home and abroad.
• Building a stronger Army by drawing on the strength, support and success of all the diverse backgrounds and communities across America represented by the Soldiers in the Army Reserve.
• Anticipating the ever-evovling needs of today’s modern Army and helping it transform into a smaller, faster, stronger force wile continuing to protect the nation’s interests.
• Implementing national objectives.
• Keeping the Army mobile, efficient and complete by providing specialized technological and troop support when and where it’s needed most.
• Supporting national policies.
• Preserving the peace and security, and providing for the defense of the United Stated, the Territories, Commonwealths and Possessions, and any areas occupied by the United States.
• Overcoming aggressive acts from nations and terroriest groups that imperil the peace and security of the United States.
• Giving back to the community by providing civil support, i.e. food, shelter, safe drinking wated and medical attention to our citizens during emergenies and natural disasters. (AR)
This modernization of warfighting has seen a change in strategic context and effectiveness which is changing the definition of military service as the role and mission of the Army evolves (2007). What isn’t changing with all the advancements in technology and leadership understanding is the comprehension of the need to prepare the Reserve force adequately enough to perform to standard. U.S. Code Title 10 states the purpose of the Reserve force is:
The purpose of each reserve component is to provide trained units and qualified persons available for active duty in the armed forces, in time of war or national emergency, and at such other times as the national security may require, to fill the needs of the armed forces whenever more units and persons are needed than are in the regular components (Cornell). The facts are clear, that in order to have a force capable of performing any task deemed needed, the Army must have a force in size that can fulfill that need but not when the need is not immediately at hand. Therefore a reserve force willing to perform the tasks of career soldiers with a tenth of the training and experience possed by the Regular Army force. The transformation is not working nor is the message getting from the executive level management down to the forces. The employee level and first to mid level management do not believe in the efficiency being projected or the promoted results of the success in the current and most recent conflicts. It would seem, that the process is using the significantly reduced numbers of fatalities as a measure for success in the implementation of the use of the Army Reserve force. This assessment ideology is not only deceiving but it is completely wrong. Advancements in technology and equipment are the primary factors for the drastic reductions in combat fatalities coupled with medical advancements in an array of trauma areas. Suffice it to say, the numbers do not tell the truth about the combat readiness and the capability of our Army Reserve force. In a pole fifty personnel, twenty five Regular Army and twenty five Army Reservists, the facts of just how far off the message is from the executive level leadership and the reality being experienced by the employee level depicts a completely different picture. In fact, given just five questions comparing Regular Army and Army Reservists the numbers here speak volumes about the five categories identified in this survey. The categories are training, proficiency, professionalism, management survivability. It would appear that Army Reserve soldiers believe their Regular Army counterpart are better trained with a score of 4.56 out of 5 when asked on a scale of 1 to 5 with 1 being strongly disagree, 2 being disagree, 3 being not sure, 4 being agree and 5 being strongly agree, are Regular Army forces trained adequately enough to face any conflict in the modern world today both foreign and domestic? That same question given to Regular Army soldiers resulted in a score of 4.64, a variance of just .08 in the Regular Army’s personal evaluation. When supplementing the target of the question with the Army Reserve the results are astonishing. The Army Reserve soldiers believe their training efficiency to be a 2.88 where the Regular Army thinks the Army Reserve training scores a 1.72. That’s a discrepancy of .16 but the bigger picture here is the idea that the Army Reserve forces do not believe they are capable of performing the required tasks due to the lack of preparation. Furthermore, the Regular Army soldiers think even less of the training quality the Army Reserve soldiers receive. This is a depiction of system breakdown. The mission statement of the Army Reserve simply does not meet the basic designs of making the mission statement short, linking highly desirable and socially appealing goals to the focus of the unit, and stating the contributions intended (2010 ). The goals are unrealistic and therefore not transfering to the targeted employees. In a hierarchical division of labor such as that of the Army Reserve, which is by design organized by vertical specialization. The transfer of information gets muted and losses its meaning. The ability for soldiers to get the message back up the breadth of the organization is as difficult if not more so than getting the message down to them. During the survey the same group of soldiers was asked; If Regular Army soldiers are proficient in the use of their personal equipment, vehicles and weapons? As in the case of training, the numbers indicate that Army Reserve soldiers believe that Regular Army soldiers are proficient in the use of their equipment, they are competent in maintaining and using their vehicles and are skilled in the use of their weapons scoring a 4.36 out of a perfect 5. The Regular Army soldiers self assessment resulted in a 4.20 revealing a disparity of .16. This would indicate that both Army Reserve soldiers and Regular Army soldiers value the amount of exposure Regular Army soldiers have with their equipment and the experience they gain from hands on employment of those tools on a daily basis. Whereas the lack of experience for Army Reserve soldiers is depicted in the 2.8 score in proficiency and supported in the 2.0 score given the Army Reserve by the Regular Army soldiers. Here we have a picture developing that says the Army Reserve soldiers do not feel they get enough training nor are they comfortable with the knowledge they possess of the equipment they are asked used. In comparison to the Army Reserve mission statement, these two categories alone preclude the fulfillment of any goal set forth by the executives of the organization. The third category of the survey is an evaluation of the general acceptance of Army beliefs, values and norms. In interpreting and assimilating to the ideology of service, a soldier indoctrinates his acceptance of these concepts into his own character. This process gives the soldier a sense of membership with the organization and ownership of its practices and principles. In the self assessing of themselves the Army Reserve soldiers evaluated their professionalism at 3.44, the highest category score for the Army Reserve soldiers of the five categories. The Regular Army soldiers viewed the Army Reserve soldiers at a 1.92 in professionalism scoring the highest difference in the survey at 1.52. In this case the impression of assimilation is in direct reflection of the ability for Army Reserve soldiers to give themselves to the organization and believe in the concepts and ideas they are being given by the executives. The problem with the mission statement of the Army Reserve is not just the confusing goals and miscommunication of those goals but the fact that the employees do not believe in the organizations principles. Management is the fourth category of the survey that asks the question: Is the Regular Army managed well through performance, promotions, schools and assignments in a way that meets mission needs? Army Reserve soldiers using a varied system in these areas than that of Regular Army soldiers, had a score of 2.88 for the Army Reserve but felt that Regular Army did a better job of managing their soldier’s careers with a score of 4.28. The Regular Army soldiers presented data scores of 1.92 and 4.08 respectively for Army Reserves and Regular Army. Again these results show a lack of confidence in the Army Reserve system and its leadership by the Army Reserve soldiers and that the Regular Army soldiers do not value or give much merit to the Army Reserve education system and promotion system. Given that Army Reserve soldiers attend Regular Army schools in some cases and in other cases they attend short versions so as to not exceed their annual requirements for training, it stands to reason that soldiers who attend a school designed for a purpose would expect all others fulfilling that purpose to attend the school in the same manner. The fifth and final survey question poses the most revealing and significant question of all: If you were deploying to combat today, would you have full confidence in the successful accomplishment of the mission and survival if deploying with a Regular Army unit? The results of this survey question detail the need for change in practices and procedure for the Army Reserve. It is not surprising to think that Regular Army soldiers would have little to no confidence in the Army Reserve forces in this scenario. Regular Army forces evaluated the Army Reserve with a score of 1.92 and a self evaluation of 4.60 while the Army Reserve soldiers rated the Regular Army with a higher vote of confidence scoring 4.72 and a self assessment of 2.68. To think we send soldiers into combat with the honest belief that they don’t think they are going to survive or even have a great chance of survival with the soldiers they are with is wrong. This survey proves that not only are the leaders of the Army Reserve and Department of the Army not getting the message from the employees of the Army Reserve but that they are allowing such things as defense spending budget cuts to determine whether or not a Army Reserve soldier is ready to overlook that 90% preparedness differential between himself and the Regular Army soldier he is going to replace. In a time period where senior leaders of the Army are persecuted for following the instructions of the civilians appointed over them, it would seem America needs another soldier of moral courage and ethical fortitude like General Abrams, the leader who would not just nod his head and acknowledge defeat if he knows it is not the right thing to do. Perhaps we could even use another shoot them in the belly and continue to attack General like George S. Patton who did not let the barriers of twenty five levels management stand in the way of getting down to the place where the rubber meets the road and giving the employee base the idea of what is to come straight from his mouth, face to face. Without question there must be something done to modernize a force we have depended on so heavily for the past millennium plus years and yet come to neglect and dispel as inept and inefficient. The Army Reserve force has a long and illustrious history of supporting our nation in its time of need. With a change in training requirements that could be supported through Congress, this deficiency could be corrected and improve every category evaluated as derelict in this survey. By increasing the annual requirement to equal a 64 day training requirement increase for Army Reserve soldiers, thus reservists would then be required to conduct 104 days of annual training. This would be facilitated by conducting two weekend drills a month totally 48 days. Along with an increase in two week training requirements where Army Reserve soldiers are currently conducting one annually to a total of four training periods of two weeks consecutively for a sum of 56 days of training.
As we draw near the conclusion of our current conflict in the Middle East we must learn from the lessons of our history that a reduction in defense spending is the catalyst to the conclusion to tactical operations. This conclusion is followed by a reduction in troop strength of Regular Army forces, where the reliance on a strong and ready Army Reserve force is greatest. However, this is also the time period where proficiency across the force is reduced and experience is diminished through natural attrition of retirement or separation. Within a decade or less, our nation will again be forced to exert our beliefs of freedom and liberty through a show of force and resolve. In our effort to move forward and advance the Regular Army forces with technology and machinery, individualization and education, we have forgotten to consider the force that stands in waiting for the balloon to go up and the call to arms to go out. They drop their careers and leave their love ones to answer the call. They deserve the same consideration of preparedness, training and education as the forces they are asked to augment and or replace on the battlefield.
References
Brown, J. S. (Brown 2008). The Army Reserve at 100. Army, 58(4), 94-95. Retrieved from EBSCO host.
National Guard/Reserve Report. (2008). Army, 58(4), 88-89. Retrieved from EBSCO host.
Pullen, R. (2001). Army Reserve responds to terrorist attacks. Army Reserve Magazine, 47(3), 6. Retrieved from EBSCO host.
Birtle, A. J. (Birtle 2008). PROVN, Westmoreland, and the Historians: A Reappraisal. Journal of Military History, 72(4), 1213-1247. Retrieved from EBSCO host
Tomes, Robert R. (2007). US Defense Strategy From Vietnam to Operation Iraqi Freedom: Military Innovation and the New American Way of War, 1973- 2003. London, New York Taylor & Francis Routledge. Retrieved from Net Library

Schermerhorn, J, Hunt, J, Osborn, R, & Bien, M. (2010). Organizational behavior. Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley And Sons Bibliography
General Patton Jr., George S., (1944). The Speech of June 5, 1944. England, Retrieved January 21, 2011, from: http://www.pattonhq.com/speech.html

Colby, Frank Moore M.A., (1913). The New international year book: a compendium of the world’s progress. New York, Dodd, Mead & Company. Retrieved February 2, 2011.

Creighton W. Abrams, (2004). Encyclopedia of World Biography. Retrieved February 20, 2011 from: Encyclopedia.com: http://www.encyclopedia.com/doc/1G2-3404700034.html Global Security, (2011). Retrieved February 8, 2011 from: http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/agency/army/usar-history.htm

Army Reserve, (AR). The Mission of the Army Reserve. Retrieved February 13, 2011 from: http://www.usar.army.mil/arweb/mission/Pages/default.aspx

Cornell University Law School, (Cornell). U.S. Code Title 10. Legal Information Institute. Retrieved February 18, 2011 from: http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/uscode10/usc_sec_10_00010102----000-.html

Appendix A
Survey Questions

Appendix B
Army Reserve Survey Results

Appendix C
Regular Army Survey