How far was the Provisional government responsible for its own downfall?
The Provisional Government made many mistakes, such as their response to the Kornilov affair that ended in the Bolsheviks gaining arms and regard amongst the Russian people, which became disastrous for its popularity and effectiveness, and their decision to keep Russia in WW1 which had a domino effect of food shortages and unrest. The unrest and unsatisfaction theat the Provisional Government brought upon itself was the most influential factor for its downfall. However, let it not be forgotten that the task the Provisional Government had was a vast and difficult one, what with Russia being so large and diverse and the complications of theWar. Indeed, any organisation that attempted to recover Russia after the February revolution was almost doomed from the outset. Although, had the situation been handled more effectively by pertaining to the people’s desires: granting more land reforms, taking Russia out of the First World War, the Provisional Government may have been able to sidestep the challenges and pull Russia into a democracy. It was because of their lack of grasp on the situation that doomed them.
Their lack of grasp was enhanced by their political situation and decisions; in particular the fact that they had a system of dual power with the Petrograd Soviet. This contributed to their downfall because although certain individuals acted as ‘bridges’ between the two governments, overall the two organisations could not agree because the Provisional Government was liberal and the Petrograd Soviet was left wing, this meant that they found it difficult to trust each other and make decisions that they were both invested in; indeed this was not helped by ‘Order Number 1’ that was passed in March 1917, this order meant that laws could not be passed without the consent of the Petrograd Soviet, hence decisions were not made and the people of Russia grew tired of waiting for reforms, it was inevitable that the Provisional Government should fail. Another political decision that doomed the Government to its downfall was the Prime Minister’s response to the Kornilov affair. Alexander Kerensky panicked when General Lavr Georgyerich marched into Petrograd with his armed men. Kerensky feared a military takeover but Kornilov claimed to be protecting the city against any more Bolshevik protests that had been about during the July days. In response, Kerensky released many imprisoned Bolsheviks from jail (jailed after the July Days), armed them and tasked them with defending Petrograd against the soldiers. This lack of communication between people of high command demonstrated to the people that they were not being ruled by secure and strong leaders, thus, the Government lost respect, with Kerensky losing support from the right without gaining any support from the left and discipline in the army beginning to fall at an alarming rate. This is not surprising seeing as the Government seemed to hold onto Russia in an extremely precarious fashion ; the leaders relied on the voluntary consent of their men who were quickly losing patience with the lack of change the dual power system was currently delivering. Meanwhile, the Bolsheviks were portrayed as being the protectors of Petrograd which heightened their popularity and consequently armed them with weapons, given to them directly by the Government. In conclusion, the decision Kerensky made in September in the Kornilov affair seriously discredited him, it made him look weak and vulnerable while the Bolsheviks looked strong and capable, thus, the Provisional Government once again actively started to dig their grave.
The provisional Goverment’s inability to tackle land reforms contributed to their economic and social misunderstanding which consequently caused their downfall. The most the Government was prepared to do to tackle land reforms was to agree to the establishment of land committees to gather information on land ownership which would be used when land reforms were proposed in the distant future. This roused violent social unrest in the countryside amongst the peasants; there were illegal seizures of land and chaos, in fact, in June 1917 alone, the government had received 200 complaints about illegal attacks on property. The Government could do little to control the countryside seeing as they lacked the man power but they did establish a grain monopoly on 25th March and a system of food committees to fix prices but the peasants didn’t want to sell foods at fixed prices and so the system was scrapped. A rationing system was introduced on 29th April but two months later it had still not been implemented. Finally, at the end of August, the Government doubled prices to encourage the peasantry but this only fuelled inflation. These three failed attempts at gaining control in the countryside demonstrate that the Provisional Government although tasked with an exceedingly difficult operation simply were not up to controlling Russia, it is no wonder they were taken over by the Bolsheviks. Another influential economic and social reason why the Provisional government failed was the decision to keep Russia in WW1. This impacted heavily on the soldiers who suffered defeat after defeat with a dearth amount of rifles to each man (by 1914, 6.5 million men had been sent to war, but only equipped with 4.6 million rifles which only deteriorated as the War went on). Also, the war meant that Russia’s economy was mightily unstable and food shortages (due to peasants hoarding grain) caused anger and unrest in cities, causing people to adopt the mantra of ‘Peace Bread and Land’ which sided with the Bolsheviks and lost the Government support. Overall, the social and economic environments that the Government created during their rule (Such as lack of control in the country side and the devastating effect of the war) contributed massively to their own downfall.

However, the Provisional Government was under certain pressures that perhaps meant they were forced to carry out certain decisions that affected their popularity. Choosing to stay in the war had benefits that the Provisional Government was keen to have; by staying, Russia could keep all of her territory and the Allies would keep funding the Government with loans because they needed Russia to stay in the war (otherwise, Germany could take her troops out of Russia which would increase the pressure on the Allies). The loss of those loans and territories would be, in the Government’s view, too large a price to pay. Furthermore, if the war ended, 7 million armed peasants would return home which would make ruling even more difficult. In this way, the previously stated misjudged decisions of the Government were in fact just unfortunate outcomes of the Government trying to involve themselves in the greater good. However, it cannot be doubted that keeping soldiers in the war was disastrous, perhaps Russia would have been a very different place had the Provisional Government taken a risk and pulled Russia out of the War, just as the Bolsheviks would do once they got into power.
The return of Lenin was also a factor that contributed to the Government’s downfall that was out of their control; however, his return had little impact due to the fact that his April Theses were not received well by the people, they believed him to be ignorant to the state of Russia because he had been out of it for so long. Also, Lenin was sent back to Russia by the Germans which made people suspicious of him. The July Days made the party look unorganised and sporadic and Lenin was foced to hide in Finland afterwards. It wasn’t until the Kornilov affair that the people began to take the Bolsheviks seriously again, but by then, the Government had already carried out their own actions (such as lack of reform, staying in the war, the failed June Offensive) that severely crippled them and caused their own downfall. In this way, the Government alone was responsible for its failures and the return of Lenin had little impact.
In conclusion, although the Government faced an incredibly difficult task in organising Russia that any organisation would have found hard to overcome, what with the Tsarist system being in power for so long and the many diverse political groups (Mensheviks, Bolsheviks, Monarchists and Kadets) all wanting different things along with the sheer size of Russia and all of her sundry occupants, they made decisions that worsened their situation. The decision to keep Russia in the War, although they had their reasons, was a misjudged one; food shortages and a ruined economy slashed their popularity and the people began to call out for radical change, especially that of the Bolsheviks’ ideas whose attractive mantra of ‘Peace Land and Bread’ made for a striking alternative, despite the unpopularity of Lenin. The dual power system which prevented reforms due to Order Number One sparked riots and chaos in the uncontrollable countryside which is an example of the Government’s poor conduct along with the humiliating failure of the June Offensive against Austro-Hungary, whereupon many Russians began to desert the army, indeed, by August, over a quarter of a million soldiers had deserted, not only because of war-weariness, but also to have their share of the illegal seizures of land that were going on back home. The Provisional Government’s lack of a grasp on the situation is obvious, it is this, more than Lenin’s return and the checkmate position they found themselves in in regards to the War that caused their downfall.