...Power 1. Scope This one hour block of instruction introduces the student to the nature of combat power and how Army forces use the warfighting functions to generate combat power. The eight elements of combat power include the six warfighting functions—movement and maneuver, intelligence, fires, sustainment, command and control, and protection—multiplied by leadership and complemented by information. Commanders use combined arms to increase the effects of combat power through complementary and reinforcing capabilities. Army forces achieve combined arms through force tailoring, task organization, and mutual support. Most, if not all, students have experienced deployments prior to attending their Captain’s Career Course. This material will draw upon not just doctrinal references and instructor/mentor experiences but also student knowledge and deployment experiences. The outcome of this lesson is to continue building the foundational knowledge to produce Tactical-level Full Spectrum Operators. This lesson will focus on developing leaders who can plan, prepare, execute, and assess simultaneous operations. Instructors should strive to include student experiences as well as share their own to more fully develop the lesson material. At the end of this lesson, students should be aware of the eight elements of combat power, the warfighting functions and how they integrate in Full Spectrum Operations. The learning objectives of the Explain Army Task Organization lesson fosters the...
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...of the implementation of warfghting functions into the rear area operations actions will be affected due to the changes of political decisions and evolving nature of the operational environment. It may sounds easy and executable on first sight and leaves such an impression, but rear area operations have as big burden and value as the close and deep area operations. Rear area operations provide security for personnel, material, facilities and their basic purpose is establishing uninterrupted support and freedom of action of the forces as a whole especially to those forces involved in deep and close area operations extending the operational reach. The working climate,...
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...The Doctrine 2015 Army Study Guide Mission Command Center of Excellence, Doctrine 2015 http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/MCCOE/Doctrine2015Tables.asp Doctrine 2015 is transforming the Army's doctrinal base to deliver doctrine - clear, concise, current and accessible - to the point of need. This process accelerates the implementation of new doctrine across the force by providing the Army with a completely revised structure of manuals. Doctrine 2015 captures the essential lessons learned from 10+ years of persistent conflict. It leverages a broader range of available collaborative technologies including wiki, interactive media instruction, video books, blogs and social media. Most importantly, it makes doctrine more accessible to Soldiers whether they are in a learning, training or operational environment."Our force has been operating at the speed of war for a decade-it's time our doctrine caught up." LTG Perkins, Commanding General, US Army Combined Arms Center, ARMY Magazine, March 2012. Created by: SAMANTHA S. SHIRLEY SGM, USA S-3 SGM, 86th ESB BLDG 21100, Room 3117 FT Bliss, TX 79918 COM: 915.741.4866 DSN: 312.711.4866 BB: 520.508.8370 NIPR: samantha.s.shirley.mil@mail.mil AKO: samantha.shirley@us.army.mil The NCO Creed No one is more professional than I. I am a Noncommissioned Officer, a leader of Soldiers. As a Noncommissioned Officer, I realize that I am a member of a time-honored corps, which is known as “The Backbone of the Army”. I am proud of...
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...The Marine Corps’ command philosophy of mission command and maneuver warfare are rested in several tenants one of which being the single-battle concept. The foundational constructs and very nature of the MAGTF ranging from task organization, capabilities, assets, and employment models across the spectrums of warfare, warfighting functions, and domains characterize and achieve this concept of single-battle. This inter-connectivity of assets and capabilities all couched within a Commander’s Design, allows for the MAGTF to be preeminently qualified to conduct operations in which all activities are driven towards a single goal and mutually support each other. Each of the MAGTFs’ elements, the Command Element (CE), the Ground Combat Element (GCE),...
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...mission command repeatedly for inspiration. Although Washington lacked the capability to match his foe conventionally, he understood the importance of intelligence on the battlefield. Washington’s superior use of multiple intelligence techniques leveled the playing field by setting the conditions for a war of attrition the British were ill suited to pursue. Battle Analysis revealed British General Sir Henry Clinton’s faulty mission command, strategy for the colonial...
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...Military Technology Land Force Air And Missile Defence Dealing With The Complexities Of Future Warfighting Lieutenant Colonel Inger Lawes Abstract In the future, land force commanders will need to manage the use of airspace to enable multidimensional manoeuvre—coordinating joint and coalition assets and denying adversaries. Battlespace management, in an era of uninhabited and automated systems, is becoming increasingly complex. The author argues for the development of a ‘land force air and missile defence’ (LFAMD) to enhance friendly capability and defeat conventional and asymmetrical enemy manoeuvre. Introduction T he Australian Defence Force (ADF) Future Warfighting concept asserts that ‘the challenges of complex environments reinforce our view that warfare is multi-dimensional.’ 1 In future warfare, because of the presence of both conventional and asymmetric air threats, air and missile defence will become an essential capability in enabling the land force to conduct multi-dimensional manoeuvre. Australian Army Journal • Volume III, Number 2 • page 109 Military Technology • Lieutenant Colonel Inger Lawes The Future Land Operating Concept Complex Warfighting describes the contemporary operational environment in terms of defining characteristics such as complex physical, human and informational terrain and urban environments, increased threat diversity, diffusion and lethality. These characteristics necessarily impose a broader spectrum...
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...The Chancellorsville Campaign: Mission Command In late April, 1863, the American Civil War was ongoing for two bloody years but the Armies of the North and South met near Spotsylvania, Virginia. Major General Joseph Hooker’s Army of the Potomac marched south to the Rappahannock River, imposing on the last Confederate strong point north of the Confederate capitol (Wineman, 10). The two armies collided in Chancellorsville, which was equidistant between Washington DC and Richmond, Virginia. The Army of the Potomac marched 130,000 strong against a dug-in 60,000 man force commanded by General Lee (Luvaas, 11). During the Chancellorsville campaign, MG Joseph Hooker failed to leverage the mission command warfighting function, which led to one of the greatest Union defeats of the American Civil War. The Union’s objective was to seize the Confederate capitol of Richmond, the...
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...Name Address, City, State Zip Code Phone Number E-Mail ______________________________________________________________________________ Intelligence Analyst · Active Security Clearance ______________________________________________________________________________ Overview: Over ? years of effective All Source Production Section (ASPS) team management and leadership experience within two Special Forces units in the Army. A rational and fixated individual recognized for maintaining diligence while enduring frantic situations. Reputation verified by the following courses of action: • Producing high standards in and maintaining efficient productivity during periods of peacetime as well as wartime and operations. • Developed formats for higher-level command intelligence products such as Daily/Weekly Intelligence Summaries (INTSUMs), Daily Commander Update Briefs (CUBs), and Staff Mission Briefs (SMBs) as required. • Able to motivate, maximize productivity, and increase morale through conducting formal and informal counseling of peers and subordinates. • Performed major duties given little to no guidance in order to complete tasks in a timely manner. • Recognized as an exceptional mentor who enjoys supporting others, demonstrating a lead-by-example approach whilst working parallel as a team member to ensure a specific, unified outcome. ...
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...The United States Air Force Blueprint for Cyberspace November 2, 2009 Foreword Cyberspace is a critical global domain, in which the USAF will conduct integrated operations in support of Joint Force Commanders’ needs. The United States is not alone in recognizing the asymmetrical advantages of this domain. Potential adversaries worldwide are rapidly improving or pursuing their own cyber capabilities. Attempts to disrupt or penetrate our networks are relentless. The blueprint that follows provides a framework to meet these challenges by evolving our culture and improving our capabilities. Air Force Space Command as the lead USAF Major Command (MAJCOM) for cyberspace will execute this blueprint as a unified effort--working closely within the Air Force, and with sister services, combatant commands, Joint Staff and other partners to fully provide the necessary capabilities for the future. C. ROBERT KEHLER General, USAF Commander, AFSPC 2 November 2009 Table of Changes Date 17 Mar 2010 No. 1 Page 13 Description Reference to Minuteman crossed out in Objective 5 Table of Contents Purpose .................................................................................................... 1 Current Situation ................................................................................. 2 Presidential Guidance ........................................................................ 2 Joint Guidance ....................................................................
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...A BIG IDEA Over the past decade or more many governments, especially western governments, have taken steps to draw together a wide range of different functions, objectives and institutions under the concept of ‘national security’. This trend is driven by two simple ideas. First, countries and their citizens face many different types of security threats, and they all need to be taken seriously and given due attention and priority. Second, government has many different types of policy instruments that can be used to manage this range of security threats, and they can and should all be used in the most cost-effective combination to address the full range of security challenges. From these two ideas naturally springs a third: that governments should view the security threats they face, and the responses they make to them, holistically, and unite them under an overarching National Security Strategy. We might call these three ideas collectively ‘the idea of national security’. It is no coincidence that this idea emerged in the years after the Cold War. For forty years until 1989, one specific security issue—major war—was seen to have dominated threat perceptions, and one specific policy instrument—conventional armed forces and the intelligence apparatus that supported them—was seen to have dominated national policy priorities. As this era passed, it was natural that 2 political leaders, policymakers, analysts and voters would start to shift their attention to new threats and their priorities...
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...had always been MG Hooker’s intention of meeting General Lee on the ground of his choosing (Sears). The hasty decision to withdraw and construct defensive positions was a quick decision, designed to allow him to mass his forces in a central area, giving him the ability to use fires and protection. Transitioning from the offensive to the defense led to confederate forces out maneuvering the Union and flanking them. MG Hooker’s defensive position at Chancellorsville was heavily reliant on having real-time intelligence about his enemy’s dispositions and movements, so that the overwhelming Federal forces could be repositioned as required. However, MG Hooker had sent his cavalry—main source of intelligence gathering in the civil-war—on an ineffectual raid to the south (Sears, 71). Thus, demonstrating his lack of understand of his own plan—his visualization—and how he wanted to utilize his warfighting functions best—pore direction for his forces. With the lack of intelligence gathering resources missing on 2 May, the Confederates where able to maneuver to the Union right flank undetected, gaining the advantage of surprise. The fighting that came from the Confederate flanking maneuver left MG Hooker scrambling to reestablish a defensible line (Sears, ). With a lack of quick decision making and direction in that scramble, MG Hookers forces ceded the high ground that would be used against them by confederate artillery. The confusion on the Union side of the battle could have been...
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...BASIC BATTLE ANALYSIS: (Student Handout 1) Study Guide for Battle Analysis Overview: 1. General: The U.S. Army Command and General Staff College developed the battle analysis methodology to help its students structure their studies of battles and campaigns. The format can be easily applied by any military professional seeking insight from historical battles and campaigns to help deepen his/her understanding of warfare and the profession of arms a. The battle analysis methodology is a process for systematic study of a battle or campaign. b. This process takes the form of a checklist that ensures completeness in examining the critical aspects of the chosen subject. c. There are two forms of the Battle Analysis: Basic and Advanced. Both utilize the same four steps, but the Advanced is more complex and detailed. Also, the Advanced analyzes the strategic influences on the battle. 2. Format: The checklist is divided into four steps, each of which builds on the previous one(s) to provide a logical order for the study. a. The four steps are: (1) Define the Subject/Evaluate the sources. (2) Review the Setting (Set the Stage). (3) Describe the Action. (4) Assess the Significance of the Action. b. In the first step, you decide what battle you are going to study. In the next two, you gather the information necessary for a thorough and balanced study, and organize it in a logical manner to facilitate analysis. In the last...
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...Intelligence for the Twenty-First Century ALAN DUPONT Strategic discourse over the past decade has been dominated by a debate over the nature of future warfare and whether or not there is a ‘revolution in military affairs’ (RMA). Supporters contend that developments in military technology, especially precision guidance and high-speed data processing, in conjunction with advances in doctrine and strategy, will fundamentally transform the way in which future wars will be fought and privilege RMAcapable forces in the contest to achieve battlefield dominance.1 Sceptics, on the other hand, regard the RMA as being more evolutionary than revolutionary, and argue that many of the technical advances associated with the RMA do not necessarily presage a paradigm shift in warfare.2 However, all agree that timely, accurate and useable intelligence will be critical to the successful conduct of war in the twenty-first century, perhaps more so than in any previous era. It is surprising, therefore, how little academic attention has been devoted to the changes that are taking place in the technology, management and integration of the intelligence systems that will underpin any RMA. It is the contention of this article that the transformation of intelligence architectures, particularly in the West, is no less profound than that of the weapons, platforms and warfighting systems they are designed to support and enhance. Moreover, the cumulative weight of the changes in prospect will redefine the...
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...Extending the NATO Architecture Framework to Support Service Oriented Architectures Mr J Keefe – NATO AF Overview Dr I Bailey – SOA Views 23 May 2006 NATO NEC and the Decision Loop Understand Faster and better Cognitive Domain Knowledge Superiority Orient Information Domain Decide Better and faster Decision Superiority Decide Network Enabled Information Effects Capability Observe Act Superiority Superiority Physical Domain See first, more Act decisively NATO NEC will enable us to operate more effectively in the future strategic environment through the more efficient sharing and exploitation of information within the Alliance and with our coalition partners This will lead to better situational awareness across the board, facilitating improved decision-making, and bringing to bear the right military capabilities at the right time to achieve the desired military effect. Key Issues Clarity of vision Roadmap for change Dealing with complexity Legacy Environments – ‘stove-piped’ solutions Multiple Agencies New Technologies – SOA Information Assurance Multiple Customers Operators Operational planners Acquisition community Developers Framework and Methodology NAF Reality: Complexity of Defence Applications Reality: Complexity of Defence Applications inhibit agility inhibit agility Mainframe PC/NT apps Unix apps 3rd Party Interface AIS Reports Depository Banks Vendor Setup Budget ...
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...Mission command is the modern style of military command that, in the words of Gen. Martin E. Dempsey, requires a commander to “blend the art of command and the science of control.” In mission command, the commander is the focal point of the operations process. To carry out the operations process successfully, a commander must do the following: understand the operational environment and problem at hand, envision the end state and visualize the nature and design of the operation, direct the joint warfighting functions, constantly assess the process, and lead soldiers by providing direction and motivation. Although mission command is a newly coined term, its principles have been apparent since 1775 when the colonial army was formed. Following the initiation of the American Revolutionary War, American military troops trapped British forces inside the city of Boston. Lacking the forces necessary to attack the rebels, Gen. Thomas Gage, the British commander, opted to secure the surrounding terrain on the Charleston Peninsula. He hoped to prevent the enemy from capturing the terrain that would enable them to bombard Boston with artillery. Aware of the enemy’s plan, Col. William Prescott led approximately 1,200 soldiers atop Breed’s Hill (originally thought to be Bunker’s Hill) on June 16, 1775, and constructed an earthen redoubt. In response, the British Army deployed 2,300 soldiers to attack the colonials. After three bloody assaults, the British captured Breed’s Hill. Although...
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