Introduction:
Afghanistan has a history of a high degree of decentralization, and resistance to foreign invasion and occupation. Some have termed it the “graveyard of empires.”
Afghanistan is a landlocked country that is located approximately in the center of Asia. It is bordered by Pakistan in the south and east. Since the late 1970s Afghanistan has suffered brutal civil war in addition to foreign interventions in the form of the 1979 Soviet invasion and the 2001 U.S. invasion. The strategic interests of the great powers of the day in Afghanistan pitched against the potential threat of terrorism, religious extremism, smuggling and drug trafficking substantiates the assertion that Afghan security situation has the potential to generate effects far beyond its borders.
Afghanistan had experienced several coups since 1973, when the Afghan monarchy was overthrown by Daud Khan, who was sympathetic to Soviet overtures.
Subsequent coups reflected struggles within Afghanistan among factions with different ideas about how Afghanistan should be governed and whether it should be communist, and with degrees warmth toward the Soviet Union. The Soviets intervened following the overthrow of a pro-communist leader. In late December 1979, after several months of evident military preparation, they invaded Afganistan.
At that time, the Soviet Union and the United States were engaged in the Cold War, a global competition for the fealty of other nations. The United States was, thus, deeply interested in whether the Soviet Union would succeed in establishing a communist government loyal to Moscow in Afghanistan. In order to forestall that possibility, the United States began funding insurgent forces to oppose the Soviets.
The U.S.-funded Afghan insurgents were called mujahideen, an Arabic word that means "strugglers" or "strivers." The word has its orgins in Islam, and is related to the word jihad, but in the context of the Afghan war, it may be best understood as referring to "resistance."
The mujahideen were organized into different political parties, and armed and supported by different countries, including Saudi Arabia and Pakistan, as well as the United States, and they gained significantly in power and money during the course of the Afghan-Soviet war.
The legendary fierceness of the mujahideen fighters, their stringent, extreme version of Islam and their cause—expelling the Soviet foreigners—drew interest and support from Arab Muslims seeking an opportunity to experience, and experiment with, waging jihad.
Among those drawn to Afghanistan were a wealthy, ambitious, and pious young Saudi named Osama bin Laden and the head of the Egyptian Islamic Jihad organization, Ayman Al Zawahiri. * Mujahideen * Jihad * Ayman Al Zawahiri * Osama bin Laden

Many would argue that the story of how 9/11 came about goes back, at least, to 1979 when the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan, with which it shares a border.
The idea that the 9/11 attacks have their roots in the Soviet-Afghan war comes from bin Laden's role in it. During much of the war he, and Ayman Al Zawahiri, the Egyptian head of Islamic Jihad, an Egyptian group, lived in neighboring Pakistan. There, they cultivated Arab recruits to fight with the Afghan mujahideen. This, loosely, was the beginning of the network of roving jihadists that would become Al Qaeda later.It was also in this period that bin Laden's ideology, goals and the role of jihad within them developed.
Throughout 2001, but prior to the September 11 attacks, Bush Administration policy differed little from Clinton Administration policy: applying economic and political pressure on the Taliban while retaining some dialogue with it, and refusing to militarily assist the Northern Alliance. The September 11 Commission report said that, in the months prior to the September 11 attacks, Administration officials leaned toward providing such aid, as well as aiding anti-Taliban Pashtun. Other covert options were reportedly under consideration as well. In accordance with U.N. Security Council Resolution, in February 2001 the State Department ordered the Taliban representative office in New York closed, although Taliban representative Abdul Hakim Mujahid continued to operate informally. In one significant departure from Clinton Administration policy, the Bush Administration stepped up engagement with Pakistan to try to reduce its support for the Taliban. At that time, there were widespread but unconfirmed allegations that Pakistani advisers were helping the Taliban in their fight against the Northern Alliance.
Since the start of the invasion, American forces in Afghanistan have faced continued opposition. Taliban followers continue to attack American forces, including soldiers from Ohio, and their allies. Nevertheless, thanks to the United States and their allies, Afghanistan has created a more democratic government. The invasion forces between October 2001 and August 2005 suffered 289 killed soldiers, including 231 Americans. Most of the American soldiers died in accidents. American soldiers remain in Afghanistan in 2005, prompting several peaceful protests in the United States.

An Al-Qaeda and Taliban Nexus (October 15, 1999)
The United Nations Security Council adopts Resolution 1267, creating the so-called al-Qaeda and Taliban Sanctions Committee, which links the two groups as terrorist entities and imposes sanctions on their funding, travel, and arms shipments. The UN move follows a period of ascendancy for al-Qaeda and its leader, Osama bin Laden, who guided the terror group from Afghanistan and Peshawar, Pakistan, in the late 1980s, to Sudan in 1991, and back to Afghanistan in the mid-1990s. The Taliban, which rose from the ashes of Afghanistan's post-Soviet civil war, provides al-Qaeda sanctuary for operations.
Terrorists Strike the United States (September 11, 2001)
Al-Qaeda operatives hijack four commercial airliners, crashing them into the World Trade Center in New York and the Pentagon in Washington, DC. A fourth plane crashes in a field in Shanksville, Pennsylvania. Close to three thousand people die in the attacks. Although Afghanistan is the base for al-Qaeda, none of the nineteen hijackers are Afghan nationals. Mohammed Atta, an Egyptian, led the group, and fifteen of the hijackers originated from Saudi Arabia. President George W. Bush vows to "win the war against terrorism,” and later zeros in on al-Qaeda and Osama bin Laden in Afghanistan. Bush eventually calls on the Taliban regime to "deliver to the United States authorities all the leaders of al-Qaeda who hide in your land," or share in their fate.

A War Footing (September 18, 2001)
President George W. Bush signs into law a joint resolution authorizing the use of force against those responsible for attacking the United States on 9/11. This joint resolution will later be cited by the Bush administration as legal rationale for its decision to take sweeping measures to combat terrorism, from invading Afghanistan, to eavesdropping on U.S. citizens without a court order, to standing up the detention camp at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.

The Opening Salvo (October 7, 2001)
The U.S. military, with British support, begins a bombing campaign against Taliban forces, officially launching Operation Enduring Freedom. Canada, Australia, Germany, and France pledge future support. The attack was military retaliation for the September 11, 2001 attacks by Al Qaeda on American targets. It was called Operation Enduring Freedom-Afghanistan. The attack followed several weeks of diplomatic effort to have al Qaeda leader, Osama bin Laden, handed over by the Taliban government.
The war's early phase mainly involves U.S. air strikes on al-Qaeda and Taliban forces that are assisted by a partnership of about one thousand U.S. Special Forces, the Northern Alliance, and ethnic Pashtun anti-Taliban forces. The first wave of conventional ground forces arrives twelve days later. Most of the ground combat is between the Taliban and its Afghan opponents.
The Taliban were toppled shortly thereafter, and a government headed by Hamid Karzai installed. There were initial claims that the brief war had been successful. But the insurgent Taliban emerged in 2006 in force, and begun using suicide tactics copied from jihadist groups elsewhere in the region.

September 11 Attacks and Operation Enduring Freedom
After the September 11 attacks, the Bush Administration decided to militarily overthrow the Taliban when it refused a final U.S. offer to extradite Bin Laden in order to avoid military action. President Bush articulated a policy that equated those who harbor terrorists to terrorists themselves, and judged that a friendly regime in Kabul was needed to enable U.S. forces to search for Al Qaeda personnel there.
U.N. and Congressional Authorization for Military Action the Administration sought U.N. backing for military action, although the outcome was perhaps less clear cut than was sought. U.N. Security Council Resolution 1368 of September 12, 2001, said that the Council “expresses its readiness to take all necessary steps to respond (implying force) to the September 11 attacks.” This was widely interpreted as a U.N. authorization for military action in response to the attacks, but it did not explicitly authorize Operation Enduring Freedom to oust the Taliban.
The War Begins
Major combat in Afghanistan (Operation Enduring Freedom, OEF) began on October 7, 2001. It consisted primarily of U.S. air-strikes on Taliban and Al Qaeda forces, facilitated by the cooperation between reported small numbers (about 1,000) of U.S. special operations forces and Central Intelligence Agency operatives. The purpose of these operations was to help the Northern Alliance and Pashtun anti-Taliban forces by providing information to direct U.S. air strikes against Taliban positions. In part, the U.S. forces and operatives worked with such Northern Alliance contacts as Fahim and Amrollah Saleh, who during November 2001-June 2010 served as Afghanistan’s intelligence director (National Directorate of Security), to weaken Taliban defenses on the Shomali plain north of Kabul. The plain extends south of Bagram Airfield, which marked the forward position of the Northern Alliance during Taliban rule. Some U.S. combat units (about 1,300 Marines) moved into Afghanistan to pressure the Taliban around Qandahar at the height of the fighting (October-December 2001), but there were few pitched battles between U.S. and Taliban soldiers.
The Taliban regime unraveled rapidly after it lost Mazar-e-Sharif on November 9, 2001, to forces led by Dostam.12 Northern Alliance forces—the commanders of which had initially promised then-Secretary of State Colin Powell that they would not enter Kabul—did so on November 12. In the process, Dostam captured Taliban fighters and imprisoned them in freight containers, causing many to suffocate. They were buried in a mass grave at Dasht-e-Laili. Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy Congressional Research Service 9 2001, to popular jubilation. The Taliban subsequently lost the south and east to U.S.-supported Pashtun leaders, including Hamid Karzai. The end of the Taliban regime is generally dated as December 9, 2001, when the Taliban surrendered Qandahar and Mullah Umar fled the city, leaving it under Pashtun tribal law.
Subsequently, U.S. and Afghan forces conducted “Operation Anaconda” in the Shah-i-Kot Valley south of Gardez (Paktia Province) during March 2-19, 2002, against 800 Al Qaeda and Taliban fighters. In March 2003, about 1,000 U.S. troops raided suspected Taliban or Al Qaeda fighters in villages around Qandahar (Operation Valiant Strike). On May 1, 2003, then-Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld announced an end to “major combat.”
The Taliban in Retreat (November 2001)
The Taliban regime unravels rapidly after its loss at Mazar-e-Sharif on November 9, 2001, to forces loyal to Abdul Rashid Dostum, an ethnic Uzbek military leader. Over the next week Taliban strongholds crumble after coalition and Northern Alliance offensives on Taloqan (11/11), Bamiyan (11/11), Herat (11/12), Kabul (11/13), and Jalalabad (11/14). On November 14, 2001, the UN Security Council passes Resolution 1378, calling for a "central role" for the United Nations in establishing a transitional administration and inviting member states to send peacekeeping forces to promote stability and aid delivery.
An Interim Government (December 5, 2001)
After the fall of Kabul in November 2001, the United Nations invites major Afghan factions, most prominently the Northern Alliance and a group led by the former king (but not the Taliban), to a conference in Bonn, Germany. On December 5, 2001, the factions sign the “Bonn Agreement,” endorsed by UN Security Council Resolution 1383. The agreement, reportedly reached with substantial Iranian diplomatic help because of Iran's support for the Northern Alliance faction, installs Hamid Karzai as interim administration head, and creates an international peacekeeping force to maintain security in Kabul. The Bonn Agreement is followed by UN Security Council Resolution 1386 on December 20, which establishes the International Security Assistance Force, or ISAF.
The Taliban Collapses (December 9, 2001)
The end of the Taliban regime is generally tied to this date, when the Taliban surrender Kandahar and Taliban leader Mullah Omar flees the city, leaving it under tribal law administered by Pashtun leaders. Despite the official fall of the Taliban, however, al-Qaeda leaders continue to hide out in the mountains.
Osama Bin laden Escapes (December 2001)
After tracking al-Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden to the well-equipped Tora Bora cave complex southeast of Kabul, Afghan militias engage in a fierce two-week battle (December 3 to 17) with al-Qaeda militants. It results in a few hundred deaths and the eventual escape of bin Laden, who is thought to have left for Pakistan on horseback on December 16--just a day before Afghan forces capture twenty of his remaining men. Despite intelligence pointing to bin Laden's presence in Tora Bora, U.S. forces do not lead the assault, which is carried out by a ragtag Afghan contingent led by Hazrat Ali, Haji Zaman, and Haji Zahir. Some critics will later question why U.S. forces did not take a more assertive role in the engagement.
Establishing a Reconstruction Model (November 2002)
The U.S. military creates a civil affairs framework to coordinate redevelopment with UN and nongovernmental organizations and to expand the authority of the Kabul government. These so-called provincial reconstruction teams, or PRTs, are stood up first in Gardez in November, followed by Bamiyan, Kunduz, Mazar-e-Sharif, Kandahar, and Herat. Command for individual PRTs is eventually handed over to NATO states. While credited with improving security for aid agencies, the model is not universally praised. Concern mounts that the PRT system lacks central controlling authority, is disorganized, and creates what a U.S. Institute of Peace report calls "an ad hoc approach" to security and development. Such criticism grows beyond the PRT program and becomes a common theme in the NATO war effort, as a maze of “national caveats” restricts the activities of member forces. Critics contend this limits the coalition's effectiveness.
An International Mission (August 2003)
The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) assumes control of international security forces (ISAF) in Afghanistan, expanding NATO/ISAF's role across the country. It is NATO's first operational commitment outside of Europe. Originally tasked with securing Kabul and its surrounding areas, NATO expands in September 2005, July 2006, and October 2006. The number of ISAF troops grows accordingly, from an initial five thousand to around sixty-five thousand troops from forty-two countries (PDF), including all twenty-eight NATO member states. In 2006, ISAF assumes command of the international military forces in eastern Afghanistan from the U.S.-led coalition, and also becomes more involved in intensive combat operations in southern Afghanistan.
Democracy and Afghanistan (September 18, 2005)
More than six million Afghans turn out to vote for the Wolesi Jirga (Council of People), the Meshrano Jirga (Council of Elders), and local councils. Considered the most democratic elections ever in Afghanistan, nearly half those casting ballots are women, viewed as a sign of political progress in a highly patriarchal and conservative society. Sixty-eight out of 249 seats are set aside for female members of Afghanistan's lower house of parliament and 23 out of 102 are reserved in the upper house.
A Bloody Resurgence (July 2006)
Violence increases across the country during the summer months, with intense fighting erupting in the south in July. The number of suicide attacks quintuples from 27 in 2005 to 139 in 2006, while remotely detonated bombings more than double, to 1,677. Despite a string of recent election successes, some experts blame a faltering central government for the spike in attacks. "As with most insurgencies, the critical precondition [to the Afghan insurgency] is the collapse of governance" (PDF), says Afghanistan expert Seth G. Jones. Jones and other experts point to the many Afghans who lack basic services, the government's difficultly setting up its police forces, and the lack of international forces to assist with security.
Collateral Killings Mount (August 22, 2008)
Afghan and UN investigations find that errant fire from a U.S. gunship killed dozens of Afghan civilians in the Shindand District of western Herat Province, drawing condemnation from President Hamid Karzai and bolstering Taliban claims that coalition forces are unable to protect the population. U.S. military officials dispute the death toll in this incident as well as claims that a separate incident in Farah Province left as many as 140 civilians dead. After being named top U.S. commander in Afghanistan in mid-2009, Gen. Stanley A. McChrystal orders an overhaul of U.S. air strike procedures. "We must avoid the trap of winning tactical victories, but suffering strategic defeats, by causing civilian casualties or excessive damage and thus alienating the people," the general writes.
Obama Recommits to Afghanistan (February 17, 2009)
New U.S. President Barack Obama announces plans to send seventeen thousand more troops to the war zone. Obama reaffirms campaign statements that Afghanistan is the more important U.S. front against terrorist forces. He says the United States will stick to a timetable to draw down most combat forces from Iraq by the end of 2011. As of January 2009 the Pentagon has thirty-seven thousand troops in Afghanistan, roughly divided between U.S. and NATO commands. Reinforcements focus on countering a "resurgent" Taliban and stemming the flow of foreign fighters over the Afghan-Pakistan border in the south. Speaking on the troop increase, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates describes the original mission in Afghanistan as "too broad" and calls for establishing limited goals such as preventing and limiting terrorist safe havens.
A New American Strategy (March 27, 2009)
President Obama announces a new strategy for the war effort, linking success in Afghanistan to a stable Pakistan. The core goal of the strategy, as outlined in an interagency white paper, is "to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al Qaeda and its safe havens in Pakistan, and to prevent their return to Pakistan or Afghanistan." The strategy urges the passage of increased aid to Pakistan and a strict standard of measuring progress in fighting al-Qaeda and the Taliban. Plans also call for the deployment of an additional four thousand soldiers to help train the Afghan army and police force. President Hamid Karzai of Afghanistan welcomes the strategy, stating that the plan “will bring Afghanistan and the international community closer to success.”
U.S. Marines launch a major offensive in southern Afghanistan, representing a major test for the U.S. military's new counterinsurgency strategy. The offensive, involving four thousand Marines, is launched in response to a growing Taliban insurgency in the country's southern provinces, especially Helmand Province. The operation focuses on restoring government services, bolstering local police forces, and protecting civilians from Taliban incursion. By August 2009 U.S. forces are to number between sixty thousand and sixty-eight thousand.
Obama’s Afghan Surge (December 1, 2009)
Nine months after renewing the U.S. commitment to the Afghan war effort, President Obama announces a major escalation of the U.S. mission. In a nationally televised speech, the president commits an additional thirty thousand forces to the fight, on top of the sixty-eight thousand in place. These forces, Obama says, "will increase our ability to train competent Afghan Security Forces, and to partner with them so that more Afghans can get into the fight. And they will help create the conditions for the United States to transfer responsibility to the Afghans." For the first time in the eight-year war effort, a time frame is put on the U.S. military presence, as Obama sets July 2011 as the start of a troop drawdown. But the president does not detail how long a drawdown will take. Obama says U.S. national interests are linked to success in the Afghan war effort, and argues that this temporary surge will force Afghan political and military institutions to assume responsibility for their own affairs.

Osama bin Laden Killed (May 1, 2011)
On May 1, 2011, al-Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden, responsible for the 9/11 attacks in New York and Washington, is killed by U.S. forces in Pakistan. The death of America's primary target for a war that started ten years ago fuels the long-simmering debate about continuing the Afghanistan war. As President Obama prepares to announce the withdrawal of some or all of the thirty thousand surge troops in July, congressional lawmakers increasingly call for a hastened drawdown of U.S. troops, though some analysts argue for a sustained military engagement. Meanwhile, anti-Pakistan rhetoric grows in Afghanistan, where officials have long blamed terrorist safe havens in Pakistan for violence in Afghanistan. Afghan President Hamid Karzai reiterates
President Obama outlines a plan to withdraw thirty-three thousand troops by the summer of 2012--the surge troops sent in December 2009--including ten thousand by the end of 2011. Polls show a record number of Americans do not support the war (Pew), and Obama faces pressure from lawmakers, particularly Democrats, to sizably reduce U.S. forces in Afghanistan (NPR). After the surge troops leave, an estimated seventy thousand U.S. troops are scheduled to stay through at least 2014. Obama confirms that the U.S. is holding preliminary peace talks with the Taliban leadership. With reconciliation in mind, the UN Security Council days earlier splits a sanctions list between members of al-Qaeda and the Taliban, making it easier to add and remove people and entities.
Taliban Cancels Talks; US Afghan tensions Flare (March 2012)
In January, the Taliban strikes a deal to open an office in Qatar, a move toward peace talks that the United States sees as a crucial part of a political settlement to ensure a stable Afghanistan. But two months later, the Taliban suspends preliminary talks, accusing Washington of reneging on promises to take meaningful steps toward a prisoner swap. In February, U.S. Defense Secretary Leon Panetta announces the Pentagon's plan to conclude combat missions by as early as mid-2013 and shift to a primarily security assistance role in Afghanistan. Meanwhile, several incidents serve as blows to the international mission, including an accidental burning of Qurans by U.S. troops and allegations that a U.S. soldier murdered at least sixteen Afghan villagers. President Hamid Karzai demands that foreign troops be withdrawn from village outposts and confined to military bases, which analysts say would greatly accelerate the pace of transition from NATO to Afghan control.
Impact of US Operations on Pakistan:
Historically Pak-Afghan relations have been never been smooth. There is no country that wants peace and stability in Afghanistan more than Pakistan, and no country stood to suffer more from instability in Afghanistan more than Pakistan. Pakistan’s geo-strategic interests require the re-establishment of a peaceful, stable and friendly Afghanistan. Unstable Afghanistan is the security threat for Pakistan.
Pakistan is significantly and directly affected by the foreign invasion in Afghanistan. The eleven years of the war in Afghanistan was a dangerous period for the national security. In the 2001, US invasion in Afghanistan create a Taliban emergence in Pakistan. Pakistan has deep historical, ethnic, religious and sectarian affinities with Pakhtoons in Afghanistan. A high percentage of the Taliban is ethnic Pashtuns; Pashtuns are a sizable minority in Pakistan and dominate the Pakistani military. Public support for the Taliban runs very high in the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. Religious elements (Taliban) are tried to enforce their agenda on Pakistani society and challenge the Pakistani constitution. From the summer of 2007 to late 2008, more than 1,500 people are killed in suicide and other attacks on civilians.
American interests create the security problem for Pakistan. In October 2001, US invasion in Afghanistan, thousands of Taliban fighters and virtually the entire intact Taliban senior leadership shura (religious council) had found sanctuary in Pakistan’s federally administered tribal area (FATA) at the center of the border, as well as in parts of the Pakistani province of Baluchistan to the west and the north west frontier province Khyber Pakhtunkhwa) to the east and south. Taliban and other religion extremist elements are operating on both sides in Pakistan and Afghanistan. The US invasion in Afghanistan in October 2001, spurred an influx of Taliban and al-Qaida militant into the FATA that would eventually result in the consolidation of extremist control in the region. These extremists’ elements are great threat for Pakistan. Many Pakistanis believe that religious extremists will try to extend its influence in other provinces; they will try to enforce their agenda on Pakistani society.
Refugee Problem: Mass migration of over 5 million refugees became a serious problem for the neighboring countries and UN. The major burden of these refugees was borne by Pakistan with 3 million refugees. This created some serious problems for Pakistan including:-
(1) Economic burden.
(2) Law and order problem.
(3) Aggravated drug and Kalashnikov culture.
(4) Disturbed demography of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Baluchistan.
(5) Burdened civic amenities.
(6) Increased unemployment.
(7) Partial control over small businesses particularly in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Baluchistan.
The global powers always had a special interest in the South Asian region due to its geostrategic importance. The interests of various international and regional players have come into sharp focus. Being an immediate neighbor, the external players’ interests in Afghanistan directly impact upon Pakistan’s interests and security.
The United States today is a catalyzing power in this same, continual Afghan warfare. U.S. actions in Afghanistan since 2001 have amplified the debilitating spillover effects of the Afghan war on Pakistan. To name a few examples: The lightly resourced, complacent U.S. approach to Afghanistan following the ouster of the Taliban in late 2001 effectively chased Islamist insurgents into Pakistan, contributing to its destabilization. Dormant, often directionless U.S. diplomacy in the region failed to bridge the deepening mistrust among the Kabul, Islamabad, and New Delhi governments after 2001, or to challenge successfully the Pakistani military's tolerance of Islamist extremist groups, including the Afghan Taliban.

Impacts of Afghan Crisis on Pakistan: 1. Talibanization of Pakistani society
The Taliban movement emerged in the context of civil war and chaotic situation prevalent since 1989 to 1994 in Afghanistan. 11A small group calling itself Taliban succeeded to bring vigilant peace, law and order and to impose sharia law in Afghanistan which got popularity among the masses. These Afghan Taliban were not only supported by Afghan People but by various seminaries and clerics in the province of Baluchistan and Khyber Pashoonkhwa of Pakistan as well. Mulla Omer was appointed the Amir ul Momineen (Commander of the faithful). Taliban captured Kabul in 1996 and hence controlled 90 % of Afghanistan. Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates promptly recognized the government of Taliban.

2. Wave of Terrorism across Pakistan
Talibanization promoted the culture of terrorism in Pakistan which includes ambushes on armed forces by TTP; target killing of religious, political and civil society figures, scholars and doctors; blowing up schools, offices of NGOs, bridges and pillions; suicide attacks in mosques and other important places. So far more than 35000 Pakistani have lost their lives in different incidents of terrorism after 9/11 including the loss of 5000 soldiers. During 2010 alone there have been 2113 militant, insurgent and sectarian attacks killing 2913 people and injuring another 5824.15 In addition, Feeling insecurity from terrorism and worst kind of law and order situation the intelligentsia of Pakistan is moving in search of better and safe future to countries such as Canada, Australia, America, England, United Arab Emirate and South Africa.

3. Baluchistan Crisis
Baluchistan always remained aloof from the interest of Pakistan. Soviet invasion, inter alia, left its impact on the politics of Baluchistan as well. Soviet intelligence net working (KGB) also instigated and exploited the nationalist movements in Baluchistan. As a result of Soviet invasion of Afghanistan; and weaponization of Pakistani society; the incident of 9/11 and occupation of Afghanistan by US accelerated the secession movement of sub-nationalist of Baluchistan. In addition, the discovery of huge mineral resources and strategically important Gwader port has increased the interest of international economic players in the region which is benefiting the separatists as they look for their financial and moral support for outside world.
Post-Taliban Governance and its Security:
The United States and its partner countries are gradually reducing military involvement in Afghanistan as the end of the formal international security mission approaches by the end of 2014. Under an agreement between President Obama and Afghan President Karzai announced January 11, 2013, Afghan forces will assume the security lead nationwide in the spring of 2013 and U.S. forces will move to a support role. The number of U.S. forces in Afghanistan, which peaked at about 100,000 in June 2011, has been reduced to a “pre-surge” level of 66,000 as of September 20, 2012, and a further draw down schedule is to be announced by mid-2013. Subsequently, the size of the U.S. force that will remain in Afghanistan after 2014 will be announced, pursuant to a bilateral security agreement between the United States and Afghanistan that is under negotiation pursuant to a May 1, 2012, U.S.-Afghan Strategic Partnership Agreement. U.S. military recommendations for the post-2014 force reportedly range from 3,000 to 20,000 U.S. forces, likely performing missions that include combat against high-value targets as well as training for the Afghanistan National Security Forces (ANSF). U.S. partners are likely to contribute a still unspecified number of forces for these missions. Still, fearing instability after 2014, some key ethnic and political faction leaders are preparing to revive their militia forces should the international drawdown lead to a major Taliban push to retake power.
To promote long-term growth and prevent a severe economic downturn as international donors scale back their involvement in Afghanistan, U.S. officials also hope to draw on Afghanistan’s vast mineral and agricultural resources. Several major privately funded mining, agricultural, and even energy development programs have begun or are beginning. U.S. officials also seek greater Afghanistan integration into regional trade and investment patterns. Persuading Afghanistan’s neighbors to support Afghanistan’s stability instead of their own particular interests has been a focus of U.S. policy since 2009, but with mixed success.
Even if these economic efforts succeed, Afghanistan will likely remain dependent on foreign aid indefinitely. Through the end of 2012, the United States has provided nearly $83 billion in assistance to Afghanistan since the fall of the Taliban, of which about $51 billion has been to equip and train Afghan forces.