In early 1835, the Mexican government began to shift away from a federalist model under the guidance of President Antonio López de Santa Anna. This, along with other dictatorial policies, incited many federalists to revolt (Todish, 1998). Texas’ border with Mexico was largely populated by immigrants from the United States. These immigrants had gotten used to a federalist government and a plethora of individual rights, and they did not hide their displeasure at Mexico's shift towards centralism (Henson, 1982). Mexican officials blamed the disturbance on these American immigrants, most of whom did not make an effort to adapt to the Mexican culture (Barr, 1990). In October, Texians engaged Mexican troops in what would become the first official battle of the Texas Revolution (Barr, 1990). Set on extinguishing this rebellion, Santa Anna began building a large force to restore order, the Army of Operations in Texas (Hardin, 1994). His military at the time was comprised of mostly raw recruits, and many of these recruits had been recruited against their will (Hardin, 1994). The Texians systematically vanquished the Mexican troops that were already stationed in Texas. General Martín Perfecto de Cos, commander of the last group of Mexican soldiers in the region, surrendered on December 9 as a result of the siege of Béxar (Barr, 1990). At this point, the Texian Army was comprised mostly of recent arrivals to the area, primarily from the United States (Barr, 1990). Santa Anna was angered by what he saw to be American interference in Mexican affairs, and he then ordered that no prisoners be taken; they were to be executed immediately (Scott, 2000).
When the Mexican troops left San Antonio de Béxar, Texian soldiers established a base at the Alamo, a former Spanish mission that had been converted to a temporary fort (Edmonson, 2000). The Alamo had been designed to withstand an attack by native Indians, but not a well equipped and trained army (Edmonson, 2000). The complex spanned 3 acres, burdening the soldiers with almost 1,320 feet of wall to defend (Edmonson, 2000). The perimeter walls of the complex were nearly three feet thick and varied in height from 9–12 feet (Myers, 1948). To compensate for the lack of firing ports in the walls, Texian engineer Green B. Jameson built catwalks to allow the defenders to fire over the walls (Edmonson, 2000). Mexican forces, in their rush to leave, had left behind 19 cannons which Jameson installed along the walls. He boasted to Sam Houston, commander of the Texian Army, that the Texians could "whip 10 to 1 with our artillery" (Hardin, 1994). Despite Jameson’s confidence, the Texian fort was vastly under-manned and under-supplied, with fewer than 100 soldiers remaining by January 6, 1836 (Todish, 1998). Colonel James C. Neill, the Alamo commander, wrote to the provisional government requesting additional troops and supplies, stressing that the fort was likely unable to withstand a siege lasting longer than four days (Todish, 1998). At this time, the Texian government was in chaos and unable to provide much assistance. On January 14, Neill approached Sam Houston for assistance in gathering supplies, clothing, and ammunition (Todish, 1998). Houston could not spare the number of men and supplies necessary for a successful defense, and instead he sent Colonel James Bowie along with 30 other men to remove the artillery and destroy the Alamo itself (Edmonson, 2000). However, Bowie was unable to remove the artillery due to a lack of draft animals in the fort and was soon persuaded to stay by Colonel Neill on the basis that this location held significant strategic importance (Hopewell, 1994). Bowie then wrote to the government requesting "men, money, rifles, and cannon powder" (Hopewell, 1994). Few reinforcements actually arrived; cavalry officer William B. Travis arrived on February 3 with 30 other men. A small group of volunteers, including Davy Crockett, arrived five days later (Hardin, 1994). Early in the morning of February 23, residents of Béxar began fleeing the city, fearing the impending arrival of the Mexican army (Nofi, 1992). By late afternoon, about 1,500 Mexican troops occupied Béxar (Todish, 1998). That night, the siege began. Initially, Mexican troops set up artillery batteries about 1,000 feet from the south, east, and southeast walls of the Alamo (Nofi, 1992). Every night, these batteries crept ever closer to the fort (Todish, 1998). For the next eight days, the Texians in the Alamo fought, waited, and endured the bombardment in hope that help would arrive. On March 3, the Texians watched from their defensive positions as nearly 1,000 more Mexican troops advanced into the city of Béxar (Todish, 1998). This arrival of reinforcements urged Travis to send Davy Crockett and two other men to find reinforcements believed to on the way and hurry their arrival (Lindley, 2003). Little did they know that Fannin had aborted the rescue, but Crockett and his scouts still found a small group of men ready to join their fight. Just before sunrise on March 4, Crockett and a part of their Texian force broke through the Mexican lines and returned to the Alamo, while the rest of the group was driven off by the Mexican troops (Lindley, 2003). At 10 PM on the moonless night of March 5, the Mexican artillery ceased fire and Santa Anna began making preparations for his final attack (Edmonson, 2000). Without the constant banging of cannons, many of the Texian defenders fell into slumber (Todish, 1998). This sleep, coupled with the dark night, allowed Mexican forces to stay concealed upon their approach. The Mexican forces killed the Texian sentinels in their sleep and let the advancement remain a secret (Hardin, 1994). This silent approach lasted until the troops were within musket range of the walls and the silence was broken by yells of “¡Viva Santa Anna!" (Edmonson, 2000). The Texians quickly assembled at their posts and began fighting for their lives to repel the invaders. The advancing columns of Mexican troops made great targets for the Texian artillery, which were loaded with anything metal that they could spare. This essentially turned each cannon into a giant shotgun that devastated the Mexican troops still in formation (Hardin, 1994). Only a few ladders ever reached the wall during this attack, and the few soldiers that made it up the ladders were repulsed quickly (Edmonson, 2000). The Mexican troops quickly withdrew and regrouped, but their second attack was defended as well. This did not deter the Mexican army, and they attacked a third time. During this third attack, many of the troops shifted to attack the north wall (Todish, 1998). When Santa Anna saw this, he swiftly sent his reserve troops to the north wall as well to reinforce those already there (Petite, 1999). The makeshift wall on the north side contained many gaps and footholds that would make it easy to climb, which the Mexican troops did. Once this wall had been breached and the door opened, it was not long before all of the other walls were taken and the Texians retreated to the barracks and chapel as previously planned (Todish, 1998). Unable to reach the barracks however, the Texians took hold wherever they could and fought until they were eventually killed. The Mexican troops searched and fought for the next hour to eradicate every Texian from within the fort (Edmonson, 2000). By 6:30 AM the battle for the Alamo was over, but it was not forgotten.
Works Cited
• Barr, Alwyn (1990), Texans in Revolt: the Battle for San Antonio, 1835, Austin, TX: University of Texas Press.
• Edmondson, J.R. (2000), The Alamo Story-From History to Current Conflicts, Plano, TX: Republic of Texas Press.
• Hardin, Stephen L. (1994), Texian Iliad, Austin, TX: University of Texas Press.
• Henson, Margaret Swett (1982), Juan Davis Bradburn: A Reappraisal of the Mexican Commander of Anahuac, College Station, TX: Texas A&M University Press.
• Hopewell, Clifford (1994), James Bowie Texas Fighting Man: A Biography, Austin, TX: Eakin Press.
• Lindley, Thomas Ricks (2003), Alamo Traces: New Evidence and New Conclusions, Lanham, MD: Republic of Texas Press.
• Myers, John Myers (1948), The Alamo, Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press.
• Nofi, Albert A. (1992), The Alamo and the Texas War of Independence, September 30, 1835 to April 21, 1836: Heroes, Myths, and History, Conshohocken, PA: Combined Books, Inc.
• Petite, Mary Deborah (1999), 1836 Facts about the Alamo and the Texas War for Independence, Mason City, IA: Savas Publishing Company.
• Scott, Robert (2000), After the Alamo, Plano, TX: Republic of Texas Press.
• Todish, Timothy J.; Todish, Terry; Spring, Ted (1998), Alamo Sourcebook, 1836: A Comprehensive Guide to the Battle of the Alamo and the Texas Revolution, Austin, TX: Eakin Press.