XAVIER INSTITUTE OF MANAGEMENT, BHUBANESWAR

Term Paper
Ecosystem and Sustainability management

Gaurav Anand | U311067 Gautam Bhut | U311068 Krishanu Chakraborty | U311073 Rahul Fatnani | U311084 Saket Vardhan | U311088 Suraj Kumar S | u311094

The term paper is an attempt to review the noble prize winning work of Elinor Ostrom,” Governing the Commons-The Evolutions of Institutions for Collective Action” and extending it to analyze the Forest Rights Act through the IAD Framework.

Contents
Introduction ................................................................................................................................................ 3 How are the Commons & CPRs defined? .................................................................................................. 3 The three dominant models ..................................................................................................................... 4 The theory of the firm............................................................................................................................... 4 The theory of the state ............................................................................................................................. 4 The problem of supply .............................................................................................................................. 4 The problem of credible commitment ...................................................................................................... 4 The problem of mutual monitoring .......................................................................................................... 5 Appropriation and provision problems..................................................................................................... 5 The Institutional Analysis and Development Framework .................................................................... 5 Introduction .............................................................................................................................................. 5 IAD Framework ......................................................................................................................................... 6 Background on the IAD and Its Grammatical Syntax ................................................................................ 7 Action Arena ............................................................................................................................................. 7 Syntax ........................................................................................................................................................ 7 Applying IAD Framework for Policy Analysis- Extending it to the Forest Rights Act .................................... 8 Action Arena ............................................................................................................................................. 8 Actors ...................................................................................................................................................... 11 The Process ............................................................................................................................................. 12 Syntax Analysis of the Forest Rights Act ................................................................................................. 14 Inference and Further Scope ...................................................................................................................... 18 References .................................................................................................................................................. 20

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Introduction
The book is an effort to: Critique the foundation of policy analysis as applied to many natural resources. Present empirical examples of successful and unsuccessful and unsuccessful efforts to govern and manage such resources. Begin effort to develop better intellectual tools to understand the capabilities and limitations of self-governing institutions for regulating much type of resources. How was it done? Describing the 3 models. Pose theoretical and empirical alternatives to these models to illustrate diversity of solutions. Finally explain how communities of individuals fashion different ways of governing commons.1

How are the Commons & CPRs defined?
The commons is a general term for shared resources in which each stakeholder has an equal interest. Studies on the commons include the information commons with issues about public knowledge, the public domain, open science, and the free exchange of ideas -- all issues at the core of a direct democracy.

Common-pool resources (CPRs) are natural or human-made resources where one person's use subtracts from another's use and where it is often necessary, but difficult and costly, to exclude other users outside the group from using the resource.. The majority of the CPR research to date has been in the areas of fisheries, forests, grazing systems, wildlife, water resources, irrigation systems, agriculture, land tenure and use, social organization, theory (social dilemmas, game theory, experimental economics, etc.), and global commons (climate change, air pollution, transboundary disputes, etc.), but CPR's can also include the broadcast spectrum.2

1,2

Governing the Commons – The evolution of Institutions for collective action, Elinor Ostrom, 1990

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The three dominant models
The tragedy of the commons, the prisoners dilemma, and the logic of collective action are all based on the free-rider problem where individual, rational, resource users act against the best interest of the users collectively. The conditions under which they hold are very particular. They apply only when the many, independently acting individuals involved have high discount rates and little mutual trust, no capacity to communicate or to enter into binding agreements, and when they do not arrange for monitoring and enforcing mechanisms to avoid overinvestment and overuse.

The three models and their many variants represent a broader and evolving theory of collective action. It provokes disagreement regarding importance/ insignificance of some variables and how best to specify key relationships.

The theory of the firm
When an entrepreneur negotiates a series of contracts with various participants that specify how they are to act in a coordinated, rather than independent, fashion, further the entrepreneur has the discretion over some range of choices. Hence, the entrepreneur is highly motivated to organize the activity in a manner as efficient as possible.

The theory of the state
A ruler instead of an entrepreneur uses the resources thus obtained to increase the general level of economic well being of the subjects to a degree sufficient that the ruler can increase tax revenues while being able to reduce the more oppressive uses of coercion. The ruler may face rebellion if the measures selected are too repressive.

The problem of supply
Establishing trust and establishing a sense of community are, mechanisms for solving the problem of supplying new institutions.

The problem of credible commitment
Unless the monitoring problem can be solved, credible commitments can‘t be made in which, external coercion is a frequently cited theoretical solution to the problem of commitment.

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The problem of mutual monitoring
Without monitoring, there can be no credible commitment and hence there is no reason to propose new rules. The process unravels from both ends, because the problem of supply is presumed unsolvable in the first place.

Appropriation and provision problems
The key problem in a CPR environment is how to allocate a fixed, time-independent quantity of resource units so that rent dissipation and uncertainty can be avoided. Spatial or temporal access to the resource is another kind of appropriation problem. Also, the investment in maintenance differs the future rate at which capital infrastructure will detoriate , decision making becomes difficult for these.

The Institutional Analysis and Development Framework
Introduction
Institutional Analysis and Development Framework emerged from the Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis at Indiana University, Bloomington. Pioneered by Elinor and Vincent Ostrom, it is the product of multiple collaborations among researchers from around the world who are interested in understanding how individuals behave in collective action settings and the institutional foundations that inform such arrangements. The Institutional Analysis and Development Framework(Henceforward referred to as IAD) is that part of the social sciences which studies how institutions— governing the behavior of two or more individuals—behave and function according to both empirical rules (informal rules-inuse and norms) and also theoretical rules (formal rules and law). This field deals with how individuals and groups construct institutions, how institutions function in practice, and how the institutions affect the society.3 The IAD Framework as described by Elinor Ostrom4 is a language that is used to test the hypothesis regarding the behavior of Individuals in community or the community as a whole under multiple levels or multiple facets of analysis subject to rules, constraints and conditions that affects the attributes of the community in question through the structure of the action arenas and the incentive driven outcomes. It is described by the author as the ―Meta language for systemic exposition of analyzing the commons.‖5 In addition to the types of relevant variables that may help explain collective choices, the IAD has identified multiple levels of institutional analysis -- operational level, the collective3 4

The Institutional Analysis and Development Framework and the Commons,Elinor Ostrom Ostrom, Elinor, Response: The Institutional Analysis and Development Framework and the Commons (2010). Cornell Law Review, Vol. 95, p. 5 Encyclopedia of Life Support Systems

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choice level, and the constitutional level – which scholars should attend to in studying these choices (Kiser and Ostrom 1982; Ostrom 1990; Ostrom 1999). The operational level of analysis is where individuals collectively make decisions about day to day activities. The collectivechoice level of analysis focuses on decisions about the choice of rules that govern operational activities. The constitutional level of analysis is concerned with the authorized actors for collective-choice decisions and the rules governing those decisions.

IAD Framework

Exogenous Variables Action Arena Interactions Evaluation Criteria Outcomes

Action Situation

Participants

Figure 1: A framework for Institution Analysis (Source: E.Ostrom, Gardner,1994)

The IAD Framework is a multi tiered structure which is evident from the figure. The three levels of analysis are for the exogenous variables, Action Arena and the evaluation criteria arising out of the Interactions between those components and the outcomes of those variables with the action arena. The first step of applying this IAD Framework is to first analyze the Action Arena which is a workable, identifiable cohesive unit of reference. More Discussion regarding the same is done at a later stage of the term paper. The second unit to identify is the actor which can be individual or corporate which includes certain assumptions about four clusters of variables: The resources that the actor brings to the situation The valuation that the actor assign to the action arena and to actions The way actors acquire ,process ,retain and use knowledge contingencies and information 6|Page

The processes actors use for selection of particular courses of action6

Background on the IAD and Its Grammatical Syntax
The IAD focuses attention on the resulting patterns of interaction and outcomes of an action arena in which decision making takes place as well as the evaluation of these outcomes. There are three types of institutional statements that we might observe in action arenas: rules, norms, and strategies (Crawford and Ostrom, 1995, 2005). The IAD‘s Institutional Grammar Tool (IGT) was first proposed by Sue Crawford and Elinor Ostrom (1995) to help systematically identify and code rules-in-form presented in various types of policy documents. The Institutional Grammar offers researchers an effective method for conducting a micro-level analysis of institutions. This valuable tool allows policy process scholars to ascertain the genetic code of policies that guide activities within various political arenas.7

Action Arena
At each level of analysis there can be one or more arenas in which the types of decisions made at that level will occur. The concept of an Action Arena does not always signify a formal setting but can always include formal avenues like courts and legislations. 8 The arena is simply a setting in which a particular action is done. The action situation has seven key components: 1) The participants in the situation, 2) the participants‘ positions, 3) the outcomes of participants‘ decisions, 4) the payoffs or costs and benefits associated with outcomes, 5) the linkages between actions and outcomes, 6) the participants‘ control in the situation, and 7) information. The variables that are essential to evaluating actors in the action arena are 1) their information processing capabilities, 2) their preferences or values for different actions, 3) their resources, and 4) the processes they use for choosing actions.9

Syntax
To the three types, rules, norms, and strategies, Crawford and Ostrom provide an ―ADICO‖ grammatical syntax. The ADICO syntax is an acronym that stands for five subcomponents of an institutional statement: attribute (A), deontic (D), aim (I), condition (C), and or else (O).

6 7

Encyclopedia of Life Support Systems Crawford, Sue E.S. and Elinor Ostrom. 1995. “A Grammar of Institutions.” American Political Science Review. 89 (3): 582-600. 8 Governing the commons- The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action, Elinor Ostrom 9 School of Public Affairs – University of Colorado- Workshop on Policy Process Research

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The three types of institutional statements are created from different combinations of the ADICO syntax: Strategies include only the attribute, aim, and a condition (AIC); norms include the attribute, deontic, aim, and condition (ADIC); and rules consist of the entire syntax, an attribute, deontic, aim, condition, and or else (ADICO). The attribute is the individual or organization to which the institutional statement applies. The portion of an institutional statement that belongs with the attribute includes the subject and the descriptions of the subject. If the subject is individuals, then the attribute might include descriptions, such as age, sex, or position (Crawford and Ostrom 2005, 141). One helpful approach for identifying the attribute is to identify the actor or organization to which the deontic or aim applies (Crawford and Ostrom 2005, 139).10 The deontic is the prescriptive operator of an institutional statement that describes what ideally is permitted, obliged, or forbidden (Crawford and Ostrom 2005, 141-49). The deontic need not always be literally written as the words permitted, obliged, or forbidden but may also come in other forms, such as may, must, should, must not, and should not(Crawford and Ostrom 2005, 141-49). The aim describes the goal or action of the statement to which the deontic refers (Crawford and Ostrom 2005, 140). The aim portion includes the intended final outcome of the action that has been performed or is under the intent of performing .The aim does not include descriptions of when and where the action is conducted. The condition represents the operators when and where for which the aim is allowed, required, or forbidden (Crawford and Ostrom 2005, 149). The when might be temporal or in relation to a process, and the where might be geographical or jurisdictional. The or else operator is the punitive action if the rule is not adhered. For the purposes of this article, we relax some of the guidelines for coding or else operators. For example, we do not require the or else operator to be backed by another institutional statement for enforcement or the incentives of the monitors (Crawford and Ostrom 2005, 150). We limit our definition because one of our objectives is to code each statement as an individual unit of observation.11

Applying IAD Framework for Policy Analysis- Extending it to the Forest Rights Act
Action Arena
The Forest Rights Act came into existence to do right what was done wrong to the forest dwellers. The forest dwellers mostly comprised of the Scheduled Tribes who not only
10 11

A Systematic Approach to Institutional Analysis : Applying Crawford and Ostrom’s Grammar, Xavier Basurto et al Ostrom, Elinor, Response: The Institutional Analysis and Development Framework and the Commons (2010). Cornell Law Review, Vol. 95, p

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inhabited the forests but also used the forests as a source of their livelihood. Even though the dwellers had been using the forest for a long period of time, their rights over the same had not been established clearly. As industrialization and urbanization grew, the need for forest resources grew substantially too because of which the Scheduled tribes and other dwellers faced displacement. The forest dwellers became victims of development and were displaced from the land where they had lived and so had their previous generations. They were denied access to the very resources that helped them earn a livelihood. The first Indian Forest Act was passed in 1865. It was a hurriedly drafted Act that was intended to bring under the control of the State certain tracts of land- as and when the State required. It made no provisions regarding rights of users. This law was amended in 1878, by which the very nature of common property was changed, and forests were brought under direct State control. A categorization was created which divided forests into three distinct categories, viz. reserve, protected and village forests. It allowed forest-produce produced in British India to be taxed by local governments, thus enabling the British government to earn revenue from the forests. Any rights people might have had over forests were seen as concessions that could be withdrawn at will. In 1894, the British government declared its first Forest Policy Resolution, in which state control and commercialization of forests again formed the dominant motif. The basic aim of this policy was apparently to conserve forests that were being fast depleted due to indiscriminate use. But what it in effect did was increase and concertize State control over forests, which enabled it to further exploit forests and supplement State revenue.12 An important legislation on forests during the colonial period was the Indian Forest Act of 1927, based on the Indian Forest Act of 1878, with a few exceptions. The period immediately following independence saw a spate of forest laws which made it abundantly clear that all interests were to be subservient to the national interest. The 1952 forest policy was apparently based on certain paramount needs of the country.13 There was a need for balanced, systematic and complementary land use that would enable its maximum utilization at least cost. There was also the need to increase afforestation to check soil erosion and expansion of the North-Western desert, and finally the necessity of continued. There was always some confusion about the right of the dwellers over the forest land and they were termed as encroachers and mercilessly evicted. The Ministry of Forests and Environment (MoEF) soon realized that the forest dwellers and scheduled tribes had been deprived of their traditional right and that those people were not really encroachers .This bill

13

Antara Roy &Sroyon Mukherjee,” THE FOREST RIGHTS ACT,2006:SETTLING LAND, UNSETTLING CONSERVATIONISTS”

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therefore came by to provide justice to the forest dwellers and scheduled tribes and to ensure that they are not evicted from the forests that they had been living in.14 A Ministry of Tribal Affairs was created in October 1999, which was to focus on ameliorating the condition of the tribal people in India. The Ministry was assigned the task of preparing a draft of The Scheduled Tribes (Recognition of Forest Rights) Bill, which was placed before the Parliament in 2005. It came about in an environment of globalization, liberalization and rapid economic growth which gave multinational powerhouses easy access to, and control of natural resources, which in turn created havoc in the lives of tribal, who never really benefited from this ‘growth’. After much debate and controversy, it was finally passed in 2006, making it a historic legislation, because for the first time the rights of forest dwelling people were being recognized in Indian Forest Policy formulation.

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Antara Roy &Sroyon Mukherjee,” THE FOREST RIGHTS ACT,2006:SETTLING LAND, UNSETTLING CONSERVATIONISTS

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Actors
Tribal Communities Entirely depends upon forest & forest products Government Policy Maker & Key External actor influencing Policy Making Forest Officials Monitoring activities of industries, Tribals, Animals in forest, Key Actors in implementation People with forest based livelihoods May/may not live in forest but dependent on forest for livelihoods Industries located in or near forest Usually ignores tribal rights NGOs & Environmentalist Fights for forest conservation and tribal rights Forest Right Act, 2006 Industries based on forest produce Have interest in forest produce, least interested in tribal rights, forest conservation

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The Process
Institutional statements are embedded in legislation, making it difficult to demarcate one unit of observation from another unit. For instance, one sentence may span multiple sections with multiple units of observation. A section or subsection may alternatively have more than one sentence or not be a sentence at all. (Classification in Table 1)

Section Level Chapter PRELIMINARY

Sample Text 0

Units of Observation

Section Level

3.The purposes of this Act, the following rights which are secure individual or community tenure or both, shall be the forest rights of forest dwelling Scheduled Tribes and other traditional forest dwellers on all forest lands, namely:(h)―habitat‖ includes the area comprising the customary habitat and such other habitats in reserved forests and protected forests of Primitive Tribal Groups and pre-agricultural communities and other forest dwelling Scheduled Tribes ; (p) ―village‖ means– (i) a village referred to in clause (b) of section 4 of the Provisions of the Panchayats (Extension to the Scheduled Areas) Act

1

Subsection Level

2

Sub Sub Section Level

3

Table 1: Finding the Units of Observations in the Forest Rights Act Furthermore, one sentence in a single section of a bill may have two or more units of observation. The smallest unit of observation is a single institutional statement, in the form of a strategy (AIC), norm (ADIC), or rule (ADICO). In looking at legislation, we discarded

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definitions, titles, preambles, and headings because they do not constitute institutional statements.15 The process can be explained through a flowchart as follows which enumerates the individual step of the policy analysis through the IAD framework. Analyzing a policy includes though not exhaustively the following steps. For the same we have taken the help of the policy analysis of US Transportation case as described in ―A Systematic Approach to Institution Analysis‖.

Figure 2: The process of ADICO classification

15

Crawford, Sue E.S. and Elinor Ostrom. 1995. “A Grammar of Institutions.” American Political Science Review. 89 (3): 582-600.

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Syntax Analysis of the Forest Rights Act
We have taken the Forest Rights Act to analyze using the Syntax as suggested by E.Ostrom in the paper ―A Grammar of Institutions”. The reason for selecting the said act that it is for the first time that an Act has been supervised and enacted in order to give shape to the common property resource like Forests.

Unit

Section

Syntax Code A D I C O A D I C O A D I

Description of the Institutional Statement Forest dwelling Scheduled Tribes and other traditional forest dwellers Shall have(must) right to hold and live, community rights minor forest produce which has been traditionally collected within or outside village boundaries; NA The Central Government shall(must) Diversion of forest land For facilities provided by Government NA The Central Government recognizes(must) vests forest rights the forest dwelling Scheduled Tribes in States or areas in States where they are declared as Scheduled Tribes in respect of all forest rights NA The Forest Rights may(may) may subsequently be modified or resettled provided that no forest rights holders shall be resettled or have their rights in any manner affected for the purposes of creating inviolate areas for wildlife conservation

Type Norm

1

Chapter II|1

Norm

2

Chapter II|4

Norm

3

Chapter II|4|1 C O A D

Rule

4

Chapter III|4|2

I

C

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O A D 5 Chapter III|4|3 I C O A D

no resettlement shall take place until facilities and land allocation at the resettlement location are complete as per the promised package The Act itself shall be(must) Recognized and vested Tribes or tribal communities or other traditional forest dwellers had occupied forest land before the 13th day of December, 2005. The vesting would stand null and void The right conferred shall be(must) Heritable and heritable but not alienable or transferable and shall be registered jointly in the name of both the spouses in case of married person conferred by Sub Section in the name of the single head in the case of a household headed by a single person and in the absence of a direct heir, the heritable right shall pass on to the next of kin. Member of a forest dwelling Scheduled Tribe or other traditional forest dweller shall be(must) evicted or removed from forest land Till the recognition and verification procedure is completed. Evicted on verification and failing on meeting the requirement(implicit) Forest rights shall be(must) recognized and vested under sub-section (1) Land shall be under the occupation of an individual or family or community on the date of commencement of this Act and shall be restricted to the area under actual occupation NA The foret Rights Act shall be(must) conferred free of all encumbrances and procedural requirements requirement of paying the ‗net present value‘ and ‗compensatory afforestation‘ for diversion of forest land Norm Norm Rule Rule Norm

6

Chapter III|4|4

I C

O A D 7 Chapter III|4|5 I C O A D I 8 Chapter III|4|6 C O A D 9 Chapter III|4|7 I C

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O A D I 10 Chapter III|4|8

NA Forest rights shall include(must) shall include the right of land to forest dwelling Scheduled Tribes and other traditional forest dwellers who can establish that they were displaced from their dwelling and cultivation without land compensation due to State development interventions, and where the land has not been used for the purpose for which it was acquired within five years of the said acquisition The Gram Sabha NA Has the authority to initiate the process for determining the nature and extent of individual or community forest rights or both that may be given to the forest dwelling Scheduled Tribes and other traditional forest dwellers within the local limits of its jurisdiction under this Act by receiving claims, consolidating and verifying them and preparing a map delineating the area of each recommended claim the Gram Sabha shall, then, pass a resolution to that effect and thereafter forward a copy of the same to the Sub-Divisional Level Committee. manner as may be prescribed for exercise of such rights NA Any person may prefer(may) a petition to the Sub-Divisional Level Committee constituted under sub-section (3) and the SubDivisional Level Committee shall consider and dispose of such petition] Provided that every such petition shall be preferred within sixty days from the date of passing of the resolution by the Gram Sabha; Provided further that no such petition shall be disposed of against the aggrieved person, unless he has been given a reasonable opportunity to present his case NA The State Government Norm Norm Norm Norm

C O A D

11

Chapter IV|6|I

I C O A D

12

Chapter IV|6|2

I

C O 13 Chapter IV|6|3 A

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D I C O A D 14 Chapter IV|6|4 I C O A D

shall(must) constitute a Sub-Divisional Level Committee to examine the resolutions passed by the Gram Sabha and prepare the records of forest rights NA Any person may prefer(may) a petition to the District Level Committee within sixty days from the date of the decision of the Sub-Divisional Level Committee aggrieved by the decision of the Sub-Divisional Level Committee NA Authority or Committee or Officers or member of such authority or Committee shall be(shall) deemed to be guilty of an offence under this Actand shall be liable to be proceeded against and punished with fine which may extend to one thousand rupees contravenes any provisions of this Act or any rule made thereunder concerning recognition of forest rights Provided that nothing contained in this subsection shall render any member of the authority or Committee or head of the department or any person referred to in this section liable to any punishment if he proves that the offence was committed without his knowledge or that he had exercised all due diligence to prevent the commission of such offence. Court shall take(shall) shall take cognizance of any offence under section 9 In case of dispute relating toa resolution of a Gram Sabha or the Gram Sabha through a resolution against any higher authority gives a notice of not less than sixty days to the State Level Monitoring Committee and the State Level Monitoring Committee has not proceeded against such authority. NA Member, Officer shall be(shall) Norm Norm Rule Norm

I 15 Chapter V|7 C

O A D I 16 Chapter V|8

C O 17 Chapter VI|9 A D

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I C O A D 16 Chapter VI|11 I C O A D 17 Chapter VI|14|1 I C O

shall be deemed to be a public servant within the meaning of section 21 of the Indian Penal Code. NA The Ministry of the Central Government dealing with Tribal Affairs shall be (shall) shall be the nodal Agency For the implementation of the provisions of the act NA The Central Government may make rules for carrying out the provisions of this Act. by notification, and subject to the condition of previous publication NA Norm Norm

Table 2: ADICO Classification of the FRA Three considerations were taken in account while selecting the Forest Rights Act as case study for this exercise 1. A legislation complex enough to have range of statements which can be classified under the ADICO grammar. 2. Secondly the legislation has been the topic of discussion in various e group discussions and previous term papers thus enabling a better understanding of the same and ensuring that IAD framework analysis is given justice. 3. Also there is a contrast in the organization targeted whose behavior would be determined by the Forest Rights Act. This is a pre requisite in applying the IAD Framework.16

Inference and Further Scope
The classification of the Forest Rights Act as an extension to the book review is an attempt to understand the IAD framework and analyze the FRA in its purview to have an idea about the policy understanding process. Our intention was to do so with special reference to the

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A Systematic Approach to Institutional Analysis : Applying Crawford and Ostrom’s Grammar, Xavier Basurto et al

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Governance of Commons and there was nothing in offering except FRA to understand the process. Further we can extend the discussion by interviewing the reader‘s of the books and taking in account of the various opinions about governing the commons.

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