After Action Review
Throughout the history of the United States, the military is usually employed to suppress insurrection and rebellion, to enforce the law as well as perform many other duties of the Federation, state and local affairs. While support to the nations is usually overshadowed by the high-profile duty of detracting it, military support is a vital mission which still continues to grow as alluded to by the number of domestic problems to which the Department of Defense (DOD) has responded to in past years (Grange & Johnson 1997, p.108). The U.S has acknowledged and prepared for terrorist attacks for years. The terrorist events in the fall of 2001 put to test the extent to which the local, State, and Federal emergencies had in responding to emergency or disaster (Fema, 2004, p. 7). London bombings of 2005, Oklahoma City Bombings of 1995, and Centennial Olympic Park bombings of 1996 have challenged the effectiveness and efficiency of emergence services in the United Kingdom, and the U.S. London bombings on July 7, 2005 have revealed several serious emergency issues, which were similar to emergency issues in 1995 and 1996 in the United States. Terrorist acts seriously undermine the stability of any society. The role of emergency services is to provide victims and injured with full information and timely assistance. Critical accidents similar to Oklahoma or Olympic park bombings reveal the major emergency inconsistencies and failures. These failures are later evaluated and addressed in numerous after-action reviews.
Emergency response to London bombings 2005 “Terrorists attacked London on 7 July 2005, claiming 52 innocent lives and injuring hundreds more. Many more people were affected by their experiences that day and in the days that followed” (Home Office Security, 2006). Emergency response to bombings was immediate and highly qualified, aimed at providing the injured with the fullest information about the causes and consequences of the critical incident. Information has become the critical element of the emergency response strategy in the post-bombings London. The first 24 hours after the critical incident have been marked with thousands of calls to police and other emergency rescue services. During one hour, more than 40,000 London citizens were trying to reach police. To make emergency response effective, police has immediately expanded the technical opportunities of emergency phone lines. Telecommunications have acquired additional emergency meaning, and have connected people with professionals who could assist them in crisis. The critical incident in London has revealed the inability of London police to answer and react to all calls. “The Casualty Bureau was overwhelmed with thousands of calls, made worse by technical problems” (Home Office Security, 2006). London’s Casualty Bureau has faced serious difficulties in looking for missing people, obtaining information about casualties, and dealing with foreign nationals. To resolve the issues, London authorities have set up a well-developed Assistance Centre, to govern, manage, distribute, and obtain the required information. The problem was in that the majority of victims did not know about the centre and could not address the Assistance center for assistance. Police lacked formal structures which could help maintain the continuous dialogue with survivors. London bombings of 2005 have revealed the need for close cooperation between police and humanitarian organizations. Cooperation between police and numerous humanitarian agencies is critical to provide survivors with the required material, medical, and related assistance. London emergency and police agencies have done everything possible to guarantee that the critical information reaches survivors by means of several humanitarian agencies. In the next 24 hours after the bombings occurred, London emergency agencies had to deal with fatalities. “An initial temporary mortuary was set up to receive fatalities within 24 hours. Over the following 48 hours, full mortuary and autopsy facilities were built in accordance with pre-prepared plans” (Home Office Security, 2006). London police departments had to coordinate fatalities from the four different bomb locations. The pre-planned autopsy arrangements were effective, but the process of body identification was too long; numerous families and relatives of victims have gone through profound distress due to the lack of objective information about the exact victims and survivors of the critical incident. The bombings have led to the creation of a new critical incident plan. The plan could be coordinated at the international level. London bombings have led to realization of potential threats and hazards, and unresolved safety issues. London bombings have become a real-life test for the pre-prepared critical incident plans earlier developed by emergency professionals.
Oklahoma City Bombings 1995 Oklahoma City Bombings were as unexpected as critical incidents in London later in 2005. In distinction from London, Oklahoma did not place communications to the forefront of the emergency rescue operations. Oklahoma City emergency strategy was headed by first-in fire companies, medical, and law enforcement personnel, civilians and voluntary organizations. A “controlled perimeter was created around the dangerous site” (The Oklahoma Department of Civil Emergency Management, 1995). Casualty Bureau has accepted and processed critical amount of information immediately after London bombings occurred. Casualty Bureau dealt with survivors. In Oklahoma, an Incident Command System was established. Incident Command System (ICS) was aimed at resolving intensive search and rescue issues, but did not deal with survivors directly. ICS served a coordination center between several emergency agencies, and facilitated the cooperation and communication between local voluntary agencies. ICS dealt with the re-distribution of resources and equipment. Oklahoma City Fire Department handled fire risks. Oklahoma City police department handled security aspects under the command of Oklahoma County Sheriff. London has displayed inability to extensively use the pre-prepared emergency plans. In distinction, Oklahoma City authorities have created a precedent of effective action and cooperation between numerous emergency agencies without any specific pre-prepared plan. Following the incident, Oklahoma City authorities have created several after-action plans to assist the survivors and to deal with victims’ families. “Oklahoma City Bombing Disaster Resource Coordination Committee was made up of government and voluntary agencies and donated funds administrators to service the unmet needs of victims which were not covered” (Suprun, 1995). From emergency management perspective, Oklahoma City bombings have revealed several serious issues. First, the response plan required modification to include the description of Law Enforcement Agencies’ responsibilities and functions. Second, local response plans had to be based on the Federal and Regional response plans, with minor changes according to specific local situation. Third, federal, state, and local emergency agencies required extensive cooperative training. Training would help numerous emergency agencies coordinate their efforts during critical incidents.
Centennial Olympic Park bombings On 27 July 1996, the Centennial Olympic Games in Atlanta were interrupted by an unprecedented example of terrorist violence and threats. A bomb blasted in the Centennial Olympic park has tainted the Summer Olympic Games 1996 with blood of the two victims and more than 111 injured. In distinction from London bombings, police agencies have been notified of the threat beforehand: the act was preceded by an anonymous call to police: “a man described by the FBI as a white American make called Atlanta police from a pay telephone two blocks from the park and said that a bomb would detonate in 30 minutes” (Bamberger, 1996). Police officers were informed of an unknown green knapsack in the park. Before the incident took place, the police department professionals have failed to identify the connection between the call and the knapsack. Despite the lack of objective information about the knapsack, law enforcement and security personnel started to move concertgoers away from the site where knapsack was located. Immediately after the explosion occurred, medical entities were prepared to accept a hundred of injured with fractures and punctures. The response to the critical incident in the Centennial Olympic Park had to be fast, not to intervene with the normal course of Olympic Games. The law enforcement and medical organizations have acted cooperatively, to prevent panics. Scarce information is available on the exact emergency management procedures agencies applied to minimize the consequences of Centennial Olympic Park incident. Emergency organizations were limited in time, but they succeeded in keeping the natural course of Olympic Games. The analysis of the three critical incidents presents us with a complex vision of emergency management response. The results of the analysis imply that each emergency response strategy is unique and must fit the specific critical incident circumstances. In all analyzed incidents, information has been the critical element of coordinating the efforts of numerous emergency agencies. Information has also been the major issue in responding to all three terrorist attacks. I think that in the aftermath of a terrorist act, law enforcement and other emergency agencies require the fullest information about the issue. Survivors need the fullest information about the scope of the incident, its consequences and possible threats. Coordination of information is critical for the success of any emergency operation. In any critical incident, I would immediately organize additional call centers for survivors and emergency professionals. Furthermore, I would also inform population about these calls centers, and the ways they can reach them. I would further request the leading mobile operators to open additional call lines, to provide victims and survivors with easy access to mobile connection and an opportunity to contact emergency rescue agencies or their relatives.
In the light of the major telecommunications inconsistencies, I would request several radio networks to provide lines for emergency employees and law enforcement professionals, who use radio to coordinate their communication with other emergency agencies. In any critical incident, regardless the exact place where a terrorist attack may take place, these solutions will guarantee better communication, coordination, and emergency response.
Conclusion
London Bombings of 2005, Oklahoma City Bombings of 1995, and Centennial Olympic Park Bombings of 1996 have revealed the importance of information in responding to critical incidents. Information has become the major issue in London Bombings emergency management. Critical incident emergency strategies require obtaining and processing the fullest information about the victims, survivors, and possible threats. In the immediate aftermath of any critical incident, emergency agencies should do everything possible to expand the communicational opportunities of emergency professionals, and to allow better access of survivors to law enforcement and medical entities. Like the U.K, the United States is faced with a series of potential threats which need quick and coordinated responses from many organizations (Strom & Eyerman 2008). What this implies is that the nation’s ability to be prepared for and respond to terrorist invasions, natural calamities as well as other big calamities depend on the best way organizations communicate with one another in coordinating and executing a joint venture. This calls for a great deal of communication, leadership as coordinated attempts aimed at overcoming cultural, legal and structural differences. From the lessons learned from the above three terrorist attacks, it is important to plan for a terrorist incident. Most important to remember is the fact that plans already instituted to support response to other types of incidents should act as the basis for planning for terrorism. In this regard the beginning point would be the hazard analysis to discover the high-risk as well as high impact threats. What should then follow is planning, training as well as exercise for the link between the prevailing state of readiness and the readiness needed for a terrorist incident (Fagel, 2005, p. 7).

References
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