The Ethnic Cleansing Of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the International Community’s Failure to Prevent Genocide

Brendan McElhaney
November 2012
African American Studies 412
War Crimes And Genocide

The war in Bosnia-Herzegovina was an intricate and bloody conflict that resulted in the death of as many as 200,000 people.[1] The international response to the war was delayed; the actions of the Serbians against the Bosnians and Muslims were tacitly accepted by the major international players including the United States, Europe, and the United Nations. As U.S. Secretary of State James Baker said regarding the situation in Yugoslavia, “We don’t have a dog in that fight.”[2] This passive view of the situation in the Balkans was also demonstrated by the actions of the European Union, United Nations, and United States early on in the conflict. As the situation in Bosnia deteriorated, the international community took a passive approach to quelling the conflict. This apathy resulted because of involvement in past wars, politics, fear, misinformation, and an overall reluctance to act unilaterally. Only in the face of continued aggression by Serbians did the international community finally intervene and bring an end to one of the worst conflicts since WWII. Yet the ending of this saga actually rewarded Serbian aggression. Through various international mandates, policies, and conventions that were either completely ignored or enforced sporadically, the Balkans suffered through massive population upheaval, untenable refugee sites, the re-emergence of concentration camps on European soil, and systematic mass murder. While the Serbs and Bosnian Serbs committed the atrocities, the international community is equally responsible because it neglected its statutory duty in the face of clear and indisputable evidence of genocide. In examining the responses of the different international players during the conflict in the Balkans, it is necessary to understand the underlying events that initiated the conflicts. The Bosnian conflict was a result of various factors that singlehandedly may not have led to war but combined proved disastrous. Yugoslavia- Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia, and Slovenia- was created after World War I as a Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes. In 1941, Yugoslavia joined the Axis pact but then refused to allow the Nazis to transport their armed forces through the country en route to Greece. Germany, of course, retaliated. In the late spring of 1941, Adolf Hitler’s troops attacked and defeated the ill-prepared Yugoslav forces, and, with the aid of Axis allies, Italy, Rumania, and Hungary, created an Independent State of Croatia and dissected parts of Serbia as war booty for its neighbors. From this dismemberment of Yugoslavia, a well-organized, effective resistance to the Nazis and Axis domination emerged led by Joseph Broz, Tito. With the help of the Allied forces, Yugoslav Communists, known as Partisans, routed the Nazis and governed the country after the Second World War. During Tito’s reign, nationalism and past animosities were discouraged; “Brotherhood and Unity” became Yugoslavia’s unofficial slogan. Although communist, Tito’s break with Soviet leader Joseph Stalin, allowed Yugoslavia, in the midst of the Cold War, to receive vital help from the United States, to successfully avoid falling under the USSR’s control.[3] After Tito’s death in 1980, Yugoslavia underwent a massive change. During the previous two decades, Yugoslavia was a model of economic prosperity. The government lowered taxes, lifted price controls, and devalued the currency to encourage exports. Yugoslavia also lifted restrictions on emigration which allowed millions of Yugoslavs to work in Western Europe; this allowed Yugoslavs to send their income home and stimulate the economy.[4] However, during the late 1970s, Yugoslavia was hit hard by increases in the price of oil, which led to severe inflation. Other economic factors began to take a toll as well. Foreign debt reached $20 billion while unemployment rose into double digits. In Kosovo, unemployment was close to one quarter of the workforce.[5] With economic instability threatening Yugoslavia’s future, Yugoslavia had no choice but to turn to the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The IMF imposed strict austerity measures that crippled the already fragile economy and sent it into a dangerous free fall. These austerity measures led to hyperinflation and massive cuts in social welfare programs.[6] The IMF’s measures had a much more profound influence than anyone at the time would realize. The social guarantees promised during the Tito regime were stripped away; people began to lose faith in their government’s ability to provide. Any allegiance the people once had to their government had deteriorated; people found loyalty to their respective ethnic groups, which helped lead to the rise of Slobodan Milosevic. In 1986, a memorandum written by academics and published in the newspaper Vecernje Novosti further increased Serbian nationalism in Yugoslavia. The document stated “Serbians were victims of economic and political discrimination by their Croat and Slovene countrymen... In Kosovo and Metohija... Serbs faced genocide.”[7] Despite renowned members of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia (LCY) condemning the document, Milosevic saw this as an opportunity to exploit the increasing nationalistic sentiments in Yugoslavia and became head of the LCY in 1987. Later in 1987, the President of Serbia, Ivan Stambolic, sent Milosevic to talk to Serbians in Kosovo. At the time, Kosovo was a highly fragmented region with a minority Serbian population who encountered abuse at the hands of the Albanian majority. Milosevic’s speech engendered nationalistic ideologies in the Serbian population, which helped Milosevic quickly become a folk hero. As a result, Ivan Stambolic was driven from office and Milosevic assumed presidency of Serbia all the while removing dissidents from the government and the Yugoslav People’s Army (JNA). Once in power, Milosevic stripped Vojvodina and Kosovo of the autonomy and seized control of Montenegro. This was significant because post-Tito Yugoslavia was governed by an eight-man presidency from six republics and two autonomous regions. Milosevic now dominated half of the constituent parties, which gave him unparalleled power in the region. Milosevic confronted the other republics with threats of political and economic centralization stemming from Belgrade. Milosevic called for a full congress of the LCY in January 1990 but ended with the dissolution of the party. In response to the disintegration of the LCY, Milosevic changed the name to the Socialist Party of Serbians (SPS) and used his control of the media and intimidation to win a large parliamentary majority in December elections.[8] The SPS consisted of the JNA and the recently abolished LCY and maintained the ideology, structures and political techniques typical of communist parties.[9] As the situation in Yugoslavia worsened, political leaders differed on what would bring them out of the domestic crisis. Although differing on how to get out of the crisis, Milan Kucan in Slovenia, Franjo Tudjman in Croatia and Milosevic in Serbia all saw nationalism as a way to galvanize the people. Out of this group, Slovenes were content with independence, not an expanded territory.[10] As Milosevic realized that both Slovenia and Croatia were headed towards independence, he undertook an agenda of creating a new enlarged Serbian state, including as much Yugoslavian territory as possible.[11] In order to do this, Milosevic took control of the media and turned them into propaganda tools, held pro-Serbian rallies, and threatened military intervention if his demands for greater authority in the federation were ignored. In the meantime, democratic elections in 1990 brought nationalistic leaders into power in Croatia and Slovenia, while reaffirming Milosevic as President. In Croatia, Franjo Tudjman, leader of the nationalistic Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ), instituted changes that increased his presidential powers and created laws that openly discriminated against the Serbian minority in Croatia.[12] The rise of these nationalistic leaders proved disastrous as both exploited traumas of the past to engender hatred between their people. During the 1940s, the Croatian “Utasha” regime of Ante Pavelic ruled an area that included large parts of Bosnia, Serbia, and Croatia. The Utasha instituted a regime of genocide against the Serbians which consisted of concentration camps and death camps which accounted for approximately 300,000 dead Serbians.[13] With the “rehabilitation” of the Utasha regime, Tudjman brought back ideologies and combined with the discriminatory laws, exacerbated the fear and angers of Serbians. Milosevic saw this opportunity to incite racial hatreds and used the media to suggest genocide against the Serbians was once again possible. Because of Tudjman’s actions, Milosevic armed Croatian Serbs who began violent resistance against the Croatian government. These actions and the disintegration of Yugoslavia pushed Croatia and Serbia to war leading to the genocide in Bosnia. As Serbs in Croatia organized militarily and politically, support flowed in through Belgrade. Individuals in the JNA and the Interior Ministry freely dispensed arms to the Croatian Serbs.[14] The Krajina Serbs announced their secession from Croatia and quickly established control in Krajina. During 1990-1991, the JNA was still committed to protecting Yugoslavia. However, Milosevic had no desire of defending Yugoslavia and was actively destroying federal institutions. Croatia and Slovenia were merely obstacles to Milosevic in his desire to fulfill his version of Manifest Destiny; Milosevic wanted control of all Serb-populated territories. Unhappy with the State of Yugoslavia and the Federal Presidency's refusal to declare a state of Emergency so Milosevic could use the JNA against student demonstrations, Milosevic declared on 15 March 1991, “Yugoslavia is finished...Yugoslavia has entered into its final stage of agony... The Republic of Serbia will no longer recognize a single decision reached by the Presidency under existing circumstances because it would be illegal.”[15] Shortly after Serbia’s secession, the situation in Krajina continued to deteriorate. The Serbian secret police were organizing Serbian communities in Croatia and Bosnia, whilst Serb paramilitaries were seizing control of police stations.[16] On 19 May 1991, Croatia won independence. A month later on 25 June 1991, Slovenia declared its independence. The JNA quickly invaded Slovenia but the war only lasted 10 days and was considered a political ploy; Croatia and Bosnia would not be so fortunate. Croatia, with a Serbian population of roughly 480,000 (12.5% of its population) was seen as an important component to bring all Serbians into one state and heightened the conflict into a war over populations as well as territory, which led to the beginnings of the deportations and genocide that would come to define the Balkans.[17] Because of the war, Croatia was partitioned and the Krajina Serbs set up their own government. The Croatian war accounted for the displacement of close to 850,000 Croats and Serbians.[18] The war in Croatia served as a template for the consequences of seceding from Yugoslavia during Milosevic’s reign of terror. However, these consequences were weighed against Bosnia’s future of being at the mercy of Milosevic. Croatia and Slovenia’s secession from the Yugoslavian federation forced the hand of Bosnia to withdraw as well. The divide in Bosnia told the story of its citizens views toward Milosevic. The Croats and Muslims felt it was necessary to secede because life under Milosevic would be akin to being second-class citizens with few to no political rights.[19] Bosnian Serbs felt differently; remaining in Yugoslavia provided them with a form of psychological comfort. Because the web of social and cultural guarantees under Tito’s Yugoslavia no longer existed, remaining part of Yugoslavia meant Bosnian Serbs were part of a larger unit that contained the Serbian homeland.[20] The Bosnia Serb leader, Radovan Karadzic, knew what would happen if Bosnia were recognized as an independent state: it would not survive one day and would “lead the Muslim people into annihilation.”[21] The factors that lead up to the Bosnian war are well understood but the reactions of the international community to the war could only be described as lackadaisical and passive. The crisis in Croatia and Bosnia required a collective effort from the international community to quell the violence. In response to the war in Croatia, the European Community responded with both mediation and sending ceasefire observers. However, it soon became evident that the EC, acting alone, could not bring a peaceful resolution of the conflict, and therefore, brought in the United Nations (UN). The UN, a group to promote international peace, security, and cooperation, drafted a number of resolutions in an effort to stop the violence, the first being Resolution 713. In addition to commending the efforts of the European Community and the support of the States participating in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), the Resolution imposed an arms embargo on the Republic of Yugoslavia.[22] The arms embargo, enacted on 25 September 1991, was easily evaded by Croatia and the JNA, with no Yugoslavia left to defend, began transforming itself into the army of Greater Serbia.[23] This arms embargo proved quite disastrous for Muslims and the Bosnian Republic under Alija Izbetgovic. The Serbians, with the backings of the JNA and paramilitary units, had a distinct military advantage because of their stockpile of arms in addition to the Bosnians’ inability to obtain weapons because of the embargo. Knowing full well that the JNA was now working with Milosevic, the international community added to the advantage of the Serbians and provided Serbians the military imbalance that was needed to fuel the conflict further. As this occurred, the UN continued efforts to bring peace to the region. Secretary General Javier Perez Cuellar appointed former U.S. States Secretary of State Cyrus Vance as his personal Envoy for Yugoslavia. Together, they met and worked with parties to the conflict in order to find a solution to the crisis.[24] Their solution consisted of an unsuccessful cease fire operation and a UN peace keeping operation. In February 1992, the UN Security Council launched the UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR) to patrol a ceasefire between ethnic Serbs and Croatian forces in Croatia. On 6 April 1992, Bosnian independence was finally recognized by the EC. On 7 April 1992, The United States recognized Bosnian independence and the UN, by resolution 749, authorized the full deployment of UNPROFOR because of the daily violations of the ceasefire. Despite these violations, the deployment of UNPROFOR did not alter the behavior of those committing the violations. UNPROFOR commanders clung tightly to the Security Council restrictions for the operation, which was defined as “peacekeeping” and not “peace enforcement.”[25] The response to the war was largely humanitarian and not a coercive one. The inability of the UN to enforce mandates made its efforts futile and allowed the Serbian forces to endanger not only the UN personnel stationed in the area, but also continue inflict major damage in Croatia and Bosnia. UN troops were responsible for maintaining safe routes and camps for refugees; however, because of their policy of non-enforcement, the UN could never really protect the largely Muslim population of Bosnia from ethnic cleansing. The burden of this responsibility brought anguish to UN officials, as one would go on to say, “We’re becoming collaborators. It’s blackmail. The choice we face is either to become agents of ethnic cleansing, or to leave tens of thousands of people to continue living their nightmare.”[26] Despite this astute observation, it would take the UN and international community more than three years before they enforced policies to stop the conflict. The refusal to craft and implement a response worthy of the grave situation became even more apparent after Bosnia’s independence on 6 April 1992. Serb Nationalist leader Radovan Karadzic decided to make good on his promise to annihilate the Muslim people. Serb Nationalists initiated discriminatory measures, dismissing Croatians and Muslims from their jobs and restricting movements. Also in April, the Arkan Tigers, led by Zeljko Raznatovic, moved into Bosnia from Krajina and laid siege to the area, continuing the artillery barrages, raping women, and deporting women and children to Croatia. On 20 May 1992, General Ratko Mladic became commander of the Republika Srpska (Bosnian Serb Republic), making concentration camps and mass graves commonplace. On 30 May 1992, President of the United States George H.W. Bush issued executive order 12808 which imposed economic sanctions on Serbia and the other factions of the Serbian government. On 4 June 1992 in a meeting with reporters, Bush was asked about the effect of the sanctions on Serbia when they appeared to be ineffective, Bush responded “I think the sanctions-- I’m not prepared to give up on the sanctions at all... It now appears that a U.S. role, catalytic role, is important...But I’m not prepared to say these sanctions will not work.”[27] Given that the sanctions were in effect for a couple of days, it was impossible for the president to know how things would result. However, once it became apparent that the sanctions did not stop Serbian aggression, Bush should have immediately followed through with his promise to have a catalytic and not the passive role he inevitably assumed. The passivity that Bush assumed was a direct result of America’s involvement in past wars and Yugoslavia’s importance to the U.S. In 1949, President Truman was criticized for “losing China” to Communism for his actions. In 1945, President Truman sent U.S. General George C. Marshall to China to negotiate a settlement of the civil war between the nationalist and communist forces. U.S. led negotiations between Chiang Kai-shek, Nationalist president of China, and Mao Zedong, leader of the communists, had failed and civil war seemed imminent. By 6 January 1946, Marshall was able to broker an immediate cease fire and the convocation of a Political Consultative Conference that would negotiate the composition of the coalition government.[28] However, the truce collapsed in the spring; Marshall’s thorough assessment of the situation in China led him to conclude that U.S. intervention would bankrupt the United States both in military personnel and financial resources. This idea of “losing” a country to Communism became one of the motivating factors in Presidents Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson’s military intervention in Vietnam. Because of the humiliation in Vietnam, the United States avoided long term military engagements and no longer viewed humanitarian reasons as a legitimate cause for intervention.[29] During the 1990s, The United States did intervene in Kuwait because Saddam Hussein was threatening the world’s oil supply. Yugoslavia and Bosnia would not be so lucky. During the 1980s, economic instability caused the Soviet Union to collapse which coupled with the Soviet Union’s President Mikhail Gorbachev’s cooperation with the United States drastically changed Yugoslavia’s importance to the United States. Yugoslavia no longer held any strategic or ideological value which factored into Bush’s decision to not intervene. Bush’s inactive stance was met with considerable opposition from Congress. Senator Robert Dole (R-KS) called for a more assertive role in Bosnia and on July 24, 1992 placed an article from the July 18, 1992 edition of The New York Times,- “A War on Civilians” by Michael T. Kaufman- in the Congressional Record.[30] In the article, Kaufman lays out the daily accounts of civilians being attacked and whole towns being destroyed at the hands of the Serbians. Being well aware of the situation in Bosnia, Bush would have no choice but to assume a catalytic role as he stated a month earlier. Yet Bush in an interview August 6, 1992 stated, “But in all honesty, I can't confirm to you some of the claims that there is, indeed, a genocidal process going on there.”[31] In addition to this, Bush claimed, as did many members of the European Community, that the war raging in Bosnia was part of a century old-feuds born out of long standing animosities. Yet this justification was completely wrong; there had been peaceful coexistence in Bosnia for over 400 hundred years. One third of all marriages in Bosnia involved different cultural backgrounds.[32] The misconception of ancient hatreds was used as an excuse to justify a policy of neglect. By passing Senate Resolution 330 on 11 August 1992, Congress tried to determine the direction of U.S. policy in Bosnia. This resolution urged the President to seek a UN Security Council resolution for the use of force in Bosnia to deliver humanitarian relief and gain access to prisoner of war camps. Both the House and the Senate were influenced by the press reports coming out of Bosnia. Despite Congress’ push for action, Bush’s reluctance to act could be contributed to the upcoming Presidential elections in 1992. With the economy reeling and Democrat Bill Clinton making a push for the White House, sending troops overseas in an election year would doom President Bush for a chance at reelection. Therefore, through his actions Bush determined that the possibility of being President for another four years was more important than the safety and livelihood of thousands of people. Bill Clinton won the Presidency in 1992 and called for a more aggressive policy in Bosnia. This apparent change was what Bosnia needed to end the crisis. Clinton seemed to understand the desperation of the situation and while still Governor and Democratic presidential nominee, stated “The United States and the International Community must take action. If the horrors of the Holocaust taught us anything, it is the high cost of remaining silent and paralyzed in the face of genocide. We must discover who is responsible for these actions and take steps to bring them to justice for these crimes against humanity."[33] President Clinton called for a policy that was known as “lift and strike.” It called for lifting the arms embargo in Resolution 713 and air strikes against Serb artillery positions. The Europeans, however, were not convinced. Unwilling to act unilaterally, Clinton sent Secretary of State Warren Christopher to Europe between March-April 1993 to convince U.S.‘s allies to support this policy. Christopher met considerable resistance in Europe; France and Great Britain objected because lifting the arms embargo would endanger their peacekeeping troops on the ground in Bosnia. As British Foreign Minister Douglas Hurd said, lifting the embargo on the Bosnian Government would not level the playing field but “level the killing field.”[34] The difficulties Christopher faced ultimately led him to come to the same misguided conclusions other leaders made about the conflict, that ancient hostilities were the culprit. Clinton was not immune to blaming ancient feuds either; Clinton read the Balkan Ghost by Robert Kaplan and his rhetoric to describe the Vance Owens peace plan that called for Bosnia to be partitioned into ten cantons demonstrated Kaplan’s novel’s influence, “I think this plan shows that a civil war which has roots going back centuries, literally centuries, based on ethnic and religious differences, has not been resolved in the way that I certainly would have hoped.”[35] The resolution to the crisis was severely dampened when Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Colin Powell passed the Powell Doctrine which stated that, military action should be used only as a last resort and only if there is a clear risk to national security by the intended target; the force, when used, should be overwhelming and disproportionate to the force used by the enemy; there must be strong support for the campaign by the general public; and there must be a clear exit strategy from the conflict in which the military is engaged. (Dubrin, 2012)

General Powell’s guidelines made military action that much more unlikely since Bosnia posed no threat to the United States. In a matter of six months, the Clinton administration moved from aggressive to a passive, non-decisive policy that allowed the conflict to continue unabated. Meanwhile in Europe, news of the camps and brutalities occurring in Bosnia was known well before the media got wind of it. Mohamed Sacirbey, the ambassador of Bosnia and Herzegovina to the UN, told Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali about the existence of camps on 15 May 1992.[36] Other reports would make clear that camps were being utilized in Bosnia; these reports came from Médicins du Monde (Doctors of the World), the UN high Commissioner for Refugees, UNPROFOR and the UN. Also, during French President Francois Mitterand’s visit to Sarajevo in late June, Izbetgovic told Mitterand of the camps and massacres of civilians and pleaded for a commission to investigate.[37] As news of the camps proliferated the media mainly through the reporting of Roy Gutman, the European Community was fragmented on how to proceed. Germany, Austria, and Portugal all called the conflict a genocide; Portuguese Prime Minister and President of the EC Cavaco Silva said “if the genocide continues then we cannot exclude a military solution.”[38] A military solution was a possibility as early as 1992, yet there was no military intervention until 1994 despite the numerous violations of both the UN resolutions and the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide which calls for the UN to “prevent and punish” genocide. Yet, almost all West European countries (bar Austria) abstained on UN General Assembly Resolution 47/121 which stated that ethnic cleansing was a form of genocide. [39] In fact, at the first ever special session of the UN Commission on Human Rights, held on 13 and 14 August 1992, Austria stated

The odious policy of ethnic cleansing must cease immediately. It is in fact genocide, in the sense of the UN Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. Such events should be the object of severe condemnation by the international community and it should put pressure on those responsible to put and end to it. (Smith, 2010, 113)

The French and British were both wise to avoid the term in order to distance themselves from any mandatory military action. In fact, Georges Kiejman, a French Foreign Ministry official summed up France’s view succinctly, “This concept [of ethnic cleansing] is in part a marginal means of propaganda which the extremists on all sides through in your face. The reality is that this is a civil war between states and their national components. [40] On 13 August 1992, UN resolution 770 did call on all nations to take “all measures necessary” to facilitate the delivery of humanitarian assistance to Sarajevo. On the same day, UN resolution 771 demanded that the International Red Cross “be granted immediate, unimpeded and continuous access to all camps, prison and detention centres.”[41] Between August 26-28 of 1992, delegates from the UN, EC, and CSCE convened at the London Conference to merge mediation efforts. The London Conference declared a set of principles that included respecting ceasefires, ban on military flights, cooperating in the delivery of humanitarian aid, cooperating with peacekeeping operations, and respecting human rights. Despite the appearance of action, these measures were rendered meaningless because neither the EC nor UN provided any course of action if these mandates were not followed. The international response regarding the conflict did not do much to stop the murders of innocent civilians. The UNPROFOR’s primary duty was to protect humanitarian aid convoys, not civilians. There was no military action to stop the camps or ethnic cleansing in Bosnia, not that the powers in Europe were inclined to do much. Germany called for much stronger sanctions against Bosnia that included international blockades, a lasting cease-fire, lifting of the arms embargo, and the immediate closure of all camps.[42] However, Germany was unwilling to suggest military actions and this led to the resignation of Christian Schwarz-Schilling, a first cabinet member of Chancellor Kohl. Although Germany was against military action, they provided support for Sarajevo by air dropping supplies and helped with patrolling the flights after the ban on military flights in August 1992.[43] Despite Germany’s views, the real power players in Europe, the UK and France, were completely against any military engagement and also took on a passive role. The British and French were determined to have a limited role in the conflict in Bosnia. Both believed the extent of their help should be humanitarian and not militarily. As Brendan Simms, Professor of the History of International Relations at Cambridge states, “The UK became afflicted by a particularly disabling form of conservative pessimism which disposed them not only to reject military intervention themselves, but to prevent anybody else, particularly the Americans, from intervening either.”[44] The frustration from Bosnia came to a head with Britain late in 1993; Bosnia threatened to launch a case at the ICJ charging the UK with complicity to genocide, but dropped its threat. Despite dropping the threat, Bosnia’s view towards UK’s involvement during the Bosnian conflict was legitimate. The UK hid behind the guise of humanitarian relief in order to avoid stopping the genocide. In Europe, the war was seen as a civil war despite the numerous reports of death camps and large scale deportations of Muslims by the Serbians. In addition to not intervening themselves, the British made it difficult for other international organizations from intervening and as a result the massacre at Srebrenica occurred. The tragedy at Srebrenica occurred as a direct result of the failure of the UN, U.S., and European community to intervene with more drastic measures. On 16 April 1993, the UN in resolution 819 declared Srebrenica a safe area that was supposed to be free from any armed attack; the UN also called for an increase in the presence of UNPROFOR. [45] On 6 May 1993, Sarajevo, Tuzla, Zepa, Gorazde, and Bihac all became safe areas as well under the same conditions as UN resolution 819. Later that day in a press conference, Bill Clinton said about safe havens, “We don’t want our people in there in basically a shooting gallery.”[46] Yet, that is exactly what they became. Leading up to the massacre in Srebrenica in July 1995, the UN passed a number a resolutions dealing with the continued aggression of the Serbians. In June 1993, UN resolution 844 authorized 7600 troops for “safe areas” and the use of air power to support UNPROFOR in its mandates.[47] On 11 January 1994, a summit was held in Brussels, Belgium with the Heads of State from various countries and they declared that “we are determined to eliminate obstacles to the accomplishment of the UNPROFOR mandate. We will continue operations to enforce the no fly zone...we reaffirm our readiness to carry out air strikes in order to prevent the strangulation of Sarajevo, the safe areas, and other threatened areas in Bosnia.”[48] Nevertheless, once Srebrenica was attacked nothing was done to stop the massacre. The Bosnian Serbs captured Srebrenica, expelled all the Muslim women and children, and executed at least 7000 men, most of whom were civilians. The Dutch peacekeepers stationed at Srebrenica could not prevent the Serbs from capturing the town and requested NATO air strikes; however, General Mladic prevented these strikes because he held Dutch peacekeepers as hostages. The Dutch peacekeepers, understaffed and underarmed, watched Serbians deport and kill thousands of Muslims in Srebrenica. After the fall of Srebrenica in 1995, one Serb soldier said, “The world has allowed us to do this. . . Tomorrow they will allow us to do the same in Zepa.”[49] The Serb soldier was correct; the Serbs inhabited Zepa and expelled the population. Although limited, an offensive was finally enacted on 11 July 1995. NATO led an air strike that destroyed two Serb tanks; the air strikes were then cut short because of the capture of Dutch soldiers as hostages. Resolution 1004 demanded that Bosnian Serbs withdraw from safe areas, but only called on the Secretary General to use all resources available.[50] A reoccurring theme throughout all the Resolutions from the UN was a call to action, but never the action. The UN hid behind its members or even worse self imposed restrictions for not doing more to stop the violence in Bosnia. On 21 July 1995, the U.S. and NATO allies warned Bosnian Serbs that more attacks on safe areas would receive counterattack. Accustomed to empty threats, The Bosnian Serbs advanced and quickly took over the safe area of Zepa. Once again, NATO reaffirmed its “strong” stance and threatened major air strikes if any more safe areas were attacked. Not surprisingly, the attacks continued with Sarajevo being shelled and killing 38 people. Yet, the response to this was different; the U.S. operating under NATO command led major air strikes against Serbian positions. This action finally led Milosevic to the negotiating table. On 1 November 1995, Tudjman, Milosevic, and Izbetgovic met in Dayton, Ohio to work out a solution to the crisis. As a result of the Dayton Agreement, Bosnia remained in existence as the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Republic was comprised of two separate entities, a Serbian one name the Republika Srpska, and a Muslim-Croat named the federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina. The actions by all actors of the international community were passive in the face of extreme aggression by the Serbians. Each actor, whether it was the U.S., UN, or European community, had the tools and the means necessary to stop the violence in a timely manner. Yet each decided it was in their national interest to adopt a passive policy and let the ethnic cleansing continue. The U.S. was curbed by their involvement in past wars, which taught them to avoid long term military campaigns in foreign countries, especially for humanitarian reasons. The campaign in Bosnia would have been strictly humanitarian; the U.S. did not see Bosnia or any of the former Yugoslavia as vitally important in any form, therefore it was an easy decision to provide a minimal amount of support. Politics also played a significant role in the international community’s decision to not intervene until much later in the war. Both the U.S. and European community were stalled by the policies of the United Kingdom and Britain. The lack of support for military intervention or lifting the arms embargo handcuffed other organizations. Unwilling to act unilaterally, these organizations used humanitarian efforts and peacekeepers to cease the violence. Yet, the lack of peace enforcement allowed defenseless Muslims to be slaughtered at the hands of the Serbians. For over four years, the international community sat and watched as helpless civilians were killed on a daily basis. Having all the tools necessary to discontinue the genocide, the international community passively waited for the killing to end. Yet to their bewilderment, the killing became more evident and more gruesome even in the face of numerous sanctions and resolutions. Without the continued aggression by the Serbians, the international community may have never intervened. The public outrage pushed the atrocities into the mainstream, yet this alone did not cause anyone to intervene militarily. Only the deaths of over 7000 men at Srebrenica and shelling attacks at Sarajevo, two designated safe areas for refugees, did the International community finally intervene militarily. Despite their intervention and the ending of the Bosnian war, the Serbians received what they were after. It was Milosevic’s vision to have an all-Serbian state and in the Dayton Peace Agreement Bosnia was partitioned into a state of Muslim-Croats and a state of Serbians. The resolution to the Bosnian War was giving territory, which was never Serbian, to Serbians as a result of thousands of rapes and murders, and the displacement of over 2,000,000 people that the Serbians carried out. To put this in perspective would be akin to giving Germany France and Yugoslavia as a result of the genocide of the Jewish population during WWII. In the end, the Serbians are responsible for the savagery during the Bosnian war. Yet, the Serbians would have never been able to reach that point without “help” from the international community in terms of turning a blind eye to their acts. The international community was complicit in the genocide due to their policy of neglect and their cavalier attitude towards the inhumanity occurring in Bosnia. As the then UN Secretary-General, Kofi Annan, stated in 1999, The community of nations decided to respond to the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina with an arms embargo, with humanitarian aid and with the deployment of a peacekeeping force. It must be clearly stated that these measures were poor substitutes for more decisive and forceful action to prevent the unfolding horror. (Smith, 2010, 109)

The Ethnic Cleansing Of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the International Community’s Failure to Prevent Genocide

Glossary of Terms

Arkan Tigers Paramilitary force created by Zeljko Raznatovic

George H.W. Bush President of the United States 1989-1993

Bill Clinton President of the United States 1993-2001

CSCE Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe

Javier Cuellar UN Secretary General 1982-1991

EC European community

HDZ Croatian Democratic Union

IMF International Monetary Fund

Alija Izbetgovic President of Bosnia 1990-1996.

JNA Yugoslav People’s Army. Began as army for Yugoslavia. Later, became Milosevic’s personal army.

Radovan Karadzic Bosnian Serb Leader

Milan Kucan President of the Republic of Slovenia 1992-2002

LCY League of Communists

Slobodan Milosevic Head of the League of Communists from 1984-1987. President of Serbia 1989-1997.

Ratko Mladic General, Commander of the Republika Srpska (Bosnian Serb Republic)

NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization

Zeljko Raznatovic Leader of the Arkan Tigers

SPS Socialist Party of Serbia

Ivan Stambolic President of Serbia before Milosevic took over in 1987.

Joseph Broz Tito Leader of the Partisans, a a resistance group of Yugoslav communists. Also, leader of Yugoslavia from 1945-1980.

Franjo Tudjman In 1989, founded the HDZ. Leader of Croatia 1989-1999.

UN United Nations

UNPROFOR UN Protection Force

UN Resolution 713 Imposed an arms embargo on the Republic of Yugoslavia.

UN Resolution 749 Authorized full deployment of UNPROFOR.

UN Resolution 770 Called on all nations to take “all measures necessary” to facilitate delivery of humanitarian assistance to Sarajevo.

UN Resolution 771 Demanded the International Red Cross be granted access to all camps and detention centers.

UN Resolution 844 Authorized 7600 troops for “safe areas” and the use of air power to support UNPROFOR in its mandates.

UN Resolution 1004 Demanded that Bosnian Serbs withdraw from safe areas.

Bibliography

Primary Sources

Interviews

1992-1993 - Book II Pub. Papers 1317 (1992-1993) Remarks on the Situation in Bosnia and an Exchange with Reporters in Colorado Springs - August 6, 1992; Bush, George H. W.

George Bush: “The President’s News Conference,” June 4, 1992. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project. Http: // www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=21050.

William J. Clinton: "Exchange With Reporters on Bosnia," May 21, 1993. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project. http:// www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=46594.

William J. Clinton: "The President's News Conference," June 17, 1993. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project. Http: // www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=46708.

UN Documents

UN Security Council Resolution 713, 25 September 1991.

UN Security Council Resolution 749, 7 April 1992.

UN Security Council Resolution 770, 13 August 1992.

UN Security Council Resolution 771, 13 August 1992.

UN Security Council Resolution 844 18 June 1993.

UN Security Council Resolution 1004, 12 July 1995.

Declaration of the Heads of State and Government, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Internet, Available from http://www.nato.int/cps/en SID-73364D74-3144351F/ natolive/official_texts_24470.htm? mode=pressrelease, accessed 4 November 2012.

Secondary Sources
Books And Articles

Dworkin, Anthony, Roy Gutman, and David Rieff. Crimes of War: What the Public Should Know. New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2007.

Judah, Tim. The Serbs: History, Myth and the Destruction of Yugoslavia. United States: Yale University Press, 1997.

Kiernan, Ben and Gellately, Robert. The Specter of Genocide Mass Murder in Historical Perspective. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003

Power, Samantha. “A Problem from Hell”: America and the Age of Genocide. New York: Harper Perennial, 2003.

Rohde, David. Endgame: The Betrayal And Fall Of Srebrenica, Europe's Worst Massacre Since World War II. New York: Penguin Books, 1998.

Silber, Laura and Little, Allen. Yugoslavia: Death of a Nation. New York: Penguin Books, 1996.

Simms, Brendan. Unfinest Hour: Britain and the Destruction of Bosnia. London, Penguin Books, 2002

Smith, Karen. Genocide and the Europeans: New York, Cambridge University Press,2010.

Tatum, Dale C. Genocide At The Dawn Of The 21st Century New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010

Totten, Samuel, and Parsons, William. Century of Genocide: Critical Essays and Eyewitness Accounts. New York: Routledge, 2004.

Weitz, Eric, A Century of Genocide. New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2003

Journals

Tierney, Dominic. “Irrelevant or Malevolent? UN arms embargoes in civil wars.” Cambridge Journals 31, no. 4 (2005): 645-664.

Webpages

Dubrin Doug, Military Strategy: Powell Doctrine, PBS. Internet. Avaiable from http:// www.pbs.org/newshour/extra/teachers/lessonplans/iraq/ powelldoctrine_short.html. Accessed 2 November 2012.

Former Yugoslavia- UNPROFOR, Department of Public Information, United Nations, Internet, Available from http://www.un.org/Depts/DPKO/Missions/unprof_b.htm, accessed 2 November 2012.

Serbia, Encyclopedia Britannica Academic Edition. Internet, Available from http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/654691/Serbia/303099/The-rise- of-Slobodan-Miloevic?anchor=ref477351, Accessed 2 November 2012.

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[1] Samuel Totten, and William S. Parsons, Century of Genocide: Critical Essays and Eyewitness Accounts. (New York: Routledge, 2004), 416.
[2] Dale C. Tatum, Genocide At The Dawn Of The 21st Century (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 61.
[3] Ibid, 65.
[4] Serbia, Encyclopedia Britannica Academic Edition. Internet, Available from http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/654783/Yugoslavia, Accessed 2 November 2012.
[5] Eric Weitz, A Century of Genocide (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2003), 206.
[6] Tatum, Genocide at the Dawn, 67.
[7] Laura Silber and Allan Little, Yugoslavia: Death of a Nation (New York: Penguin Books, 1997), 37.
[8] Serbia, Encyclopedia Britannica Academic Edition. Internet, Available from http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/654691/Serbia/303099/The-rise-of-Slobodan- Miloevic?anchor=ref477351, Accessed 2 November 2012.
[9] Weitz, Genocide, 200.
[10] Ibid, 208.
[11] Silber and Little, Yugoslavia, 26.
[12] Totten and Parsons, Century of Genocide, 421.
[13] Ibid, 422.
[14] Silber and Little, Yugoslavia, 103.
[15] Ibid, 128.
[16] Tim Judah, The Serbs: History, Myth and the Destruction of Yugoslavia (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1997), 170-171, 186-189.
[17] Weitz, Genocide, 212.
[18] Ibid, 212.
[19] Tatum, Genocide at the Dawn, 73.
[20] Ibid, 73.
[21] Weitz, Genocide, 214.
[22] UN Security Council Resolution 713 (1992), 25 September 1992.
[23] Weitz, Genocide, 212.
[24] Former Yugoslavia- UNPROFOR, Department of Public Information, United Nations, Internet, Available from http://www.un.org/Depts/DPKO/Missions/unprof_b.htm, accessed 2 November 2012.
[25] Weitz, Genocide at the Dawn, 212.
[26] Silber And Little, Yugoslavia, 247.
[27] George Bush: “The President’s News Conference,” June 4, 1992. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project. Http: //www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=21050.
[28] Marshall Mission, Encyclopedia Britannica Academic Edition. Internet, Available from http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/1574270/Marshall-Mission?anchor=ref1080839, Accessed 2 November 2012.
[29] Tatum, Genocide at the Dawn, 84.
[30] Ibid, 87.
[31] George Bush: "Remarks on the Situation in Bosnia and an Exchange With Reporters in Colorado Springs," August 6, 1992. Online by Gerhard Peter and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project. Http: //www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=21303.
[32] Tatum, Genocide at the Dawn, 72.
[33] Clifford Krauss, “U.S Backs Away From Charge of Atrocities In Bosnia Camps,” The New York Times, 7 August 1992.
[34] Dominic Tierney, “Irrelevant or Malevolent? UN arms embargoes in civil wars.” Cambridge Journals 31, no. 4 (2005): 655.
[35] William J. Clinton: "The President's News Conference," June 17, 1993. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project. Http: //www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=46708.
[36] Karen Smith. Genocide and the Europeans (New York, Cambridge University Press, 2010.), 111.
[37] Ibid, 111.
[38] Hella Pick, ‘British Troops Stay Out’, The Guardian (3 June 1992).
[39] Smith. Genocide and the Europeans, 113.
[40] Ibid, 114.
[41] UN Security Council Resolution 770 (1992), 13 August 1992.
[42] “Bush Hedges on Force”, The Advertiser (Australia), 13 August 1992.
[43] Smith. Genocide and the Europeans, 111.
[44] Brendan Simms. Unfinest Hour: Britain and the Destruction of Bosnia. (London, Penguin Books, 2002) Xvii
[45] UN Security Council Resolution 819 (1993), 16 April 1993.
[46] William J. Clinton: "Exchange With Reporters on Bosnia," May 21, 1993. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project. http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=46594.
[47] UN Security Council Resolution 844 (1993), 18 June 1993.
[48] Declaration of the Heads of State and Government, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Internet, Available from http://www.nato.int/cps/en/SID-73364D74-3144351F/natolive/official_texts_24470.htm?mode=pressrelease, accessed 4 November 2012.
[49] David Rohde. Endgame: The Betrayal and Fall Of Srebrenica, Europe's Worst Massacre Since World War II. (New York: Penguin Books) 1998.
[50] UN Security Council Resolution 1004 (1995) 12 July 1995.